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The global refugee population is at an all-time high and is expected to continue to rise 
in the near future. Recent crises in Europe as well as the refugee situation in Africa 
have once again highlighted the challenges in managing the world’s refugees. While 
both regions are currently host to a significant number of refugees, their approaches to 
managing the situation appear to differ greatly. Therefore, this thesis sets out to 
investigate approaches to refugee management in Europe and Africa. In addition, it 
aims to find an answer to the question of how the chosen approach affects long-term 
refugee management and, in turn, the prospect of achieving durable solutions for 
refugees in the respective regions. 
Through an examination of the applicable laws, both internationally and regionally, as 
well as by consulting secondary sources, the ‘European approach’ and the ‘African 
approach’ to refugee management were identified. Furthermore, a closer look at two 
case studies, one from each region, provided more insight into how international and 
regional policies are translated in the domestic context, and what the ensuing prospects 
are for durable solutions. Deterrence appeared to be prevalent in both contexts, albeit 
arguably due to different circumstances. As significant shortcomings in achieving a 
dignified and rights-respecting approach to refugee management were identified, this 




Table of Contents 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................................................. 3 
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................................... 4 
LIST OF ACRONYMS ......................................................................................................................... 7 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 9 
1.  INTRODUCTION  .......................................................................................................................... 9 
2.  STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM  .............................................................................................. 11 
3.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS  ........................................................................................................... 12 
4.  S IGNIFICANCE AND PURPOSE OF THE STU DY  ..................................................................... 12 
5.  OBJECTIVES  .............................................................................................................................. 13 
6.  METHODOLOGY  ....................................................................................................................... 13 
7.  LEGISLATION  ............................................................................................................................ 14 
8.  CHAPTER SYNOPSIS  ................................................................................................................ 15 
CHAPTER 2: THE EUROPEAN APPROACH ............................................................................... 18 
1.  INTRODUCTION  ........................................................................................................................ 18 
2.  LEGAL FRAMEWORK  ............................................................................................................... 20 
2.1 International .......................................................................................................................... 21 
2.2 Regional ................................................................................................................................ 21 
2.2.1 Common European Asylum System ............................................................................................. 22 
2.2.2 Dublin Regulation ......................................................................................................................... 23 
2.2.3 Directives ...................................................................................................................................... 25 
3.  SHORTCOMINGS  ....................................................................................................................... 26 
4.  ‘COOPERATION-BASED NON-ENTRÉE’,  ‘CONTAINED MOBILITY’  OR DETERRENCE  . 29 
4.1 European Migration Agenda 2015 ........................................................................................ 30 
4.2 EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan ............................................................................................... 30 
5.  CONCLUSION  ............................................................................................................................ 32 
CHAPTER 3: THE AFRICAN APPROACH ................................................................................... 34 
1.  INTRODUCTION  ........................................................................................................................ 34 
2.  LEGAL FRAMEWORK  ............................................................................................................... 37 
2.1 International .......................................................................................................................... 37 
2.2 Regional ................................................................................................................................ 39 
3.  SHORTCOMINGS  ....................................................................................................................... 43 
4.  A  NEW ERA OF RESPONSIBILITY-SHARING AS A DURABLE SOLUTION? ..................... 45 
4.1 The New York Declaration and the Global Compact on Refugees ...................................... 46 
5.  CONCLUSION  ............................................................................................................................ 49 
CHAPTER 4: CASE STUDIES ......................................................................................................... 51 
1.  INTRODUCTION  ........................................................................................................................ 51 
2.  CONTEXT  ................................................................................................................................... 52 
3.  REFUGEE MANAGEMENT –  DOMESTIC LEGAL FRAMEWORKS  ....................................... 53 
6 
 
3.1 Legal Framework – Denmark ............................................................................................... 54 
3.2 Legal Framework – Uganda ................................................................................................. 55 
4.  LONG-TERM REFUGEE MANAGEMENT  ................................................................................ 58 
4.1 Deterrence ............................................................................................................................. 58 
4.1.1 Right-wing populism and its policies on refugee management ..................................................... 59 
4.1.2 Deterrence as a consequence of systemic issues? ......................................................................... 63 
4.2 Self-reliance .......................................................................................................................... 65 
5.  A  CHANCE FOR DURABLE SOLUTIONS? .............................................................................. 68 
6.  CONCLUSION  ............................................................................................................................ 70 
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...................................................... 73 
1.  ENHANCING COOPERATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION  ................................................... 74 
2.  ALTERNATIVE DURABLE SOLUTIONS  .................................................................................. 75 
3.  A  NEED FOR ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS  ....................................................................... 76 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................................... 77 
PRIMARY SOURCES  ...................................................................................................................... 77 
Directives .................................................................................................................................... 77 
International Agreements............................................................................................................ 77 
Regulations ................................................................................................................................. 78 
SECONDARY SOURCES  ................................................................................................................ 78 
Books .......................................................................................................................................... 78 
Chapters in Edited Collections ................................................................................................... 79 
Commentaries ............................................................................................................................. 79 
Handbooks .................................................................................................................................. 79 
Journal Articles ........................................................................................................................... 80 
Online Sources ............................................................................................................................ 83 
Newspaper Articles..................................................................................................................... 85 
Position Papers ........................................................................................................................... 86 
Reports ........................................................................................................................................ 87 





List of Acronyms 
ACHPR African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
ARCA Aliens Registration and Control Act 
AU African Union 
CARA Control of Alien Refugees Act 
CAT  Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment 
CEAS Common European Asylum System 
CIL Customary International Law 
CJEU Court of Justice of the EU 
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
CRRF Comprehensive Refugee Responses Framework 
DPP Danish People’s Party 
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo 
EASO European Asylum Support Office 
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights 
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights 
EU European Union 
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights 
IDPs Internally Displaced Persons 
NDP National Development Plan 
OAU Organisation of African Unity 
REC Refugee Eligibility Committee 
RSD Refugee Status Determination 
SRS Self-reliance Strategy 
STA Settlement Transformative Agenda 
TEU Treaty on European Union – Maastricht Treaty 




UCC Ugandan Constitutional Court 
UCICA Ugandan Citizenship and Immigration Control Act 
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
UN United Nations 





Chapter 1: Introduction 
‘The story of humanity is essentially the story of human movement. In the near 
future, people will move even more […]. The sooner we recognize the inevitability of 
this movement, the sooner we can try to manage it.’1 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION  
By the end of 2019, the number of forcibly displaced people2 globally amounted to 
79.5 million, 26 million of whom were refugees, displaced across international borders 
– the highest documented number since the end of World War II (United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], 2020). While human migration is not a new 
phenomenon, the 2015 European ‘refugee crisis’ has once again drawn attention to the 
plight of the forcibly displaced. Europe, however, is not the only territory affected by 
the presence of many refugees. In fact, the crisis has been global for decades, with 
most of the global refugee population being located on the African continent, resulting 
in unequal distribution of the burden and responsibility that comes with refugee 
presence (International Refugee Congress, 2018). In addition, particularly in the global 
south, refugeehood is becoming increasingly protracted, meaning situations in which 
refugees remain outside the confines of their country of origin ‘for five years or more 
after their initial displacement, without immediate prospects for implementation of 
durable solutions’ (UNHCR ExCom, 2009: 3), thereby going against the very nature 
of refugeehood, which is intended to be temporary (Edwards, 2012: 606-12). 
According to leading refugee law scholars James Hathaway and Michelle 
Foster, the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (hereafter 1951 
Refugee Convention) describes refugee status as a ‘transitory phenomenon that comes 
to an end if and when a refugee can reclaim the protection of her own state or has 
secured an alternative form of enduring national protection’ (Hathaway & Foster, 
2014: 462). Reclaiming protection of his or her own state or securing an alternate form 
of protection has been referred to by the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) as achieving a durable solution to refugeehood (Souter, 2014: 
 
1 Patrick Kingsley, The New Odyssey: The Story of Europe’s Refugee Crisis (London: Faber & Faber 
Ltd., 2016), Kindle Version 5.12.2, 2, chap. 9, loc 3123 of 5194. 




172). Three such solutions have been promoted by the UNHCR: voluntary repatriation 
to the country of origin, resettlement to a third country, and local integration in the 
host country (Hathaway, 2007: 4). 
While voluntary repatriation to the country of origin may be the preferred 
choice of a durable solution for the UNHCR as well as the host country, it is not a 
viable solution in many cases because the situation that initially caused displacement 
still may not have been resolved (Hathaway, 2007: 4). Figures from 2015 show that 
only about 200,000 of the 21 million refugees worldwide returned ‘home’ to their 
country of origin. The second preferred option by many host countries is resettlement, 
which was also only successful an estimated 107,800 times in 2019 (UNHCR, 2020). 
Resettlement is difficult, primarily because only a small number of countries offer 
limited and very specific places for resettlement of refugees (Esses, Hamilton & 
Gaucher, 2017: 80).  
The third durable solution proposed by the UNHCR is that of local integration. 
Local integration is a contested term, with varying definitions by politicians and 
scholars alike. Like the other two solutions, it is difficult to implement, not least as the 
legal, economic as well as social dimensions require the full support, will to succeed 
and dedication of the country of asylum (Bidandi, 2018: 9). The European Council on 
Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) has emphasised the importance of refugee integration 
being of a reciprocal nature, placing demands on the receiving community as well as 
the individual or group to be integrated (Strang & Ager, 2010: 600). However, a lack 
of willingness by both parties, administrative barriers as well as other obstacles to 
accessing rights and, therefore, fully integrating leaves many at risk of remaining 
displaced for indefinite periods. 
Host countries have expressed concern not only about the ensuing financial 
and security implications, but also the social implications and their own ability to cope 
with a large inflow of refugees (Naldi & D’Orsi, 2014: 116). The strain on international 
aid and on the host country’s economy has resulted at all levels in an eagerness to 
manage the large-scale refugee presence, at least in theory (Open Society Foundations, 
2018). The legal framework to do so is vast, extending across international, regional 
and domestic legislation. However, despite the availability of human rights and 
refugee-specific legislation, this framework is often vague and open to interpretation. 
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As a result, the ideal approach to long-term refugee management remains unclear, as 
does the best way to achieve durable solutions.  
The chosen approach to refugee management in the respective regions and 
countries can set the tone as to which potential durable solution is being sought and 
whether the UNHCR’s solutions are even being considered. At first glance, approaches 
to refugee management differ significantly from region to region and from country to 
country. As mentioned above, two regions in the world that have been most affected 
by large-scale refugee inflow are Europe and Africa; one region where most countries 
have a very high or high human development index (HDI) and gross domestic product 
(GDP), and one with HDIs and GDPs near the lower end of the spectrum (United 
Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2017; World Bank, 2019). It can be 
assumed that factors such as geographical location as well as the political, economic 
and social realities in a region or country impact the number of refugees and 
management thereof. Keeping this in mind, the purpose of this thesis is to identify the 
‘European approach’ and the ‘African approach’ to refugee management through an 
analysis of the legislative and policy documents pertaining to migration, refugees and 
asylum. By taking a closer look at two countries as case examples, this thesis aims to 
establish prospects for human rights-oriented, long-term refugee management and the 
possibility of durable solutions to refugeehood. 
2.  STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The number of refugees in the world is at an all-time high and is expected to continue 
to rise for the foreseeable future (UNHCR, 2018). In recent years, much attention has 
been directed towards the European ‘refugee crisis’ and the introduction of 
increasingly restrictive laws and policies by the European Union (EU) and its member 
states. At the same time and for an even longer period, Africa has been experiencing a 
crisis on yet a larger scale, appearing to welcome a significant proportion of the global 
refugee population with open arms. Despite being guided by an international body of 
legislation regarding human rights, and refugee rights in particular – most notably the 
1951 Refugee Convention – the approaches to refugee management in the two regions 
seem to differ significantly. 
International refugee law recognises the importance of taking a human rights-
based approach when it comes to refugee matters, as is implied in the first preambular 
paragraph of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Hence, efforts are required from all parties 
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concerned to provide refugees with access to their rights and achieve sustainable 
solutions for refugeehood. Nevertheless, instead of cooperating and working towards 
achieving durable solutions, numerous countries throughout Europe as well as the EU 
as a whole have increasingly taken to rejecting displaced persons at their borders or 
created laws that prevent migrants from getting even close to the border (Human 
Rights Watch [HRW], 2019). In Africa, on the other hand, the introduction of self-
reliance strategies and the seemingly more liberal laws appear to consider measures 
for longer-term refugee management, with the potential to achieve durable solutions 
(Dryden-Petersen & Hovil, 2004: 27-28). However, the lauding of such policies has 
led to the frequent lack of access to even basic human rights – not just for its own 
citizens but even more so for refugees and asylum seekers – being ignored in many 
countries throughout the continent. Therefore, this thesis aims to illustrate the 
differences as well as potential similarities between the seemingly disparate 
approaches to refugee management in two regions of the world: Europe and Africa. In 
addition, given the increasingly protracted nature of refugeehood, how the chosen 
approaches impact long-term refugee management and the prospects for achieving 
durable solutions will be analysed by drawing on two country case studies. 
3.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
How do approaches to refugee management in Europe and Africa differ and how does 
this affect long-term refugee management and, in turn, durable solutions in the 
respective regions? 
a. What are the approaches in Europe and in Africa? 
b. Are the approaches truly as different as they seem? 
o Deterrence versus self-reliance? 
o Does self-reliance equal local integration? 
c. What role do the durable solutions as proposed by the UNHCR play? 
d. Are there alternatives to the UNHCR’s durable solutions? 
e. How do the current approaches affect long-term refugee management and the 
prospect of achieving durable solutions for refugees? 
4.  SIGNIFICANCE AND PURPOSE OF THE STUDY  
It has been argued that the term ‘refugee crisis’ does not simply refer to a crisis of a 
large number of forcibly displaced persons, but rather a crisis of response and, in turn, 
policy thereto. Looking at the global refugee crisis in that way highlights factors 
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surrounding forced migration and refugee presence, including the effects large-scale 
refugee inflow can have on a region, country and community, as well as taking into 
consideration the increasingly protracted nature of refugeehood and its consequences. 
Given that the number of refugees globally has continued to increase over the 
years in conjunction with the protracted nature of refugeehood, the question arises of 
what is and what should be done to ameliorate the plight of those displaced as well as 
the ‘burden’ their presence places on the respective host country. As mentioned above, 
policies towards refugees in Europe seem to be as restrictive as ever, while policies in 
Africa appear, at least on the surface, to resemble attempts to achieve long-term 
solutions.  
Hence, the significance of this research lies in analysing approaches to refugee 
management in different parts of the world with the greater aim of establishing their 
suitability in achieving durable solutions to refugeehood. Therefore, it endeavours to 
contribute to the literature on refugee management and developments therein in recent 
years. Furthermore, it will offer recommendations based on its findings in order to 
ameliorate approaches to refugee management in both contexts, working intently 
towards combatting protracted refugeehood and achieving durable solutions for the 
global refugee population. 
5.  OBJECTIVES  
The objective of this research is, first and foremost, to investigate the legal framework 
pertaining to refugees and the consequent approaches to refugee management in 
Europe and Africa. By analysing the regional legal framework in conjunction with 
international legislation pertaining to refugee issues, it shall establish the differences 
as well as potential similarities between what will be referred to as the ‘European 
approach’ and the ‘African approach’ to refugee management. Furthermore, it intends 
to establish how the chosen approach affects long-term refugee management and the 
prospects for durable solutions. 
6.  METHODOLOGY  
The methodology used in this thesis is desk-based research. Secondary literature, such 
as scholarly and journal articles as well as books on the topic will be consulted to frame 
the discussion. Furthermore, primary sources such as legislative texts, policy 
documents and official reports and statements by politicians and international 
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organisations will be discussed in order to illustrate the legal foundation for the issue. 
Given that there is unlikely to be one clear answer to the question, consultation of 
primary as well as secondary sources will allow a detailed analysis and interpretation 
of the findings, providing possible answers to the research questions. 
In order to address the question appropriately, a human rights approach will be 
taken. This is not least because refugee issues are directly linked to human rights. The 
importance of this approach is also mentioned specifically in the preamble of the 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. 
7.  LEGISLATION  
The legal framework informing refugee management is vast, spanning three levels: the 
international, the regional, and the domestic.  
The most important document regarding refugee rights specifically is the 1951 
Convention on the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol as this lays the foundation 
for all subsequent legislation regarding refugees for the signatory states. Furthermore, 
it provides the most widely recognised definition of who falls into the category of a 
‘refugee’ as well as the rights and obligations – on an international scale – that come 
with it. It notes in article 1 (United Nations [UN], 1951) that  
for the purposes of the present Convention, the term ‘refugee’ shall 
apply to any person who: 
(2) As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing 
to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, 
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of 
that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the 
country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is 
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. 
Treatment and management of refugees is further informed by the broad spectrum of 
international human rights legislation, including but not limited to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) as well as the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (CAT). 
15 
 
The refugee definition of the 1951 Refugee Convention is widely echoed and 
expanded on throughout regional legislation pertaining to refugee matters. The OAU 
Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (hereafter 
OAU Convention) is the only regional legislative document governing the protection 
of refugees that is legally binding on its signatories (Schreier, 2014: 74). It reiterates 
the definition found in the 1951 Refugee Convention in article 1 (1) and expands on it 
further in article 1 (2) (Organisation of African Unity [OAU], 1969), stating that 
the term refugee shall also apply to every person who, owing to 
external aggression, occupation or foreign domination or event 
seriously disturbing public order […] is compelled to leave his or her 
place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place 
outside his country of origin or nationality. 
Another important piece of legislation at regional level is the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) of 1981, which – besides addressing human 
rights in general – refers in article 12 (3) to the right to seek asylum (OAU, 1981). 
In the European context and EU territory, relevant legislation with regard to 
refugees and asylum seekers are the Dublin Regulation as well as numerous directives 
under the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). These documents should be 
read in conjunction with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as well 
as the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (hereafter EU Charter). In contrast to Africa, 
none of the aforementioned documents are legally binding and therefore simply inform 
and guide the conduct of the member states. 
Further legislation that will be addressed in this thesis is the domestic 
legislation pertaining to the case examples of Denmark and Uganda, which will be 
discussed in chapter four. 
8.  CHAPTER SYNOPSIS  
Chapter One: Introduction 
Chapter one will first give an introduction to and set the context for this study. It states 
the problem and the research questions, and discusses the significance or purpose, 
methodology and objectives of the thesis. In addition, a brief overview of the main 





Chapter Two: The European Approach  
Chapter two addresses what is referred to as the ‘European approach’ to refugee 
management. It constitutes a discussion of the international and regional legislation 
with regard to refugee management in Europe, specifically the European Union. This 
will be prefaced by an introduction describing how the global refugee crisis has 
affected the European continent and followed by a review of the actions or reactions 
resulting in response to the crisis. Furthermore, this chapter will discuss how EU 
asylum law leads to deterrence, giving selected examples of deterring policies that 
have been implemented at regional level. 
Chapter 3: The African Approach 
Chapter three contains a discussion of the ‘African approach’ to refugee management. 
It discusses the laws applicable to the continent, specifically the 1951 Refugee 
Convention as well as the OAU Convention. Furthermore, the appearance of 
seemingly open borders is put into question, drawing the conclusion that, similar to 
Europe, Africa’s approach to refugee management often results in deterrence, albeit 
facilitated through different laws or the lack thereof, although this is less intentional 
than the legislation of its European counterparts. 
Chapter 4: Case Studies – context-specific approaches, long-term refugee 
management and prospects for durable solutions 
In chapter four, two case studies will be discussed to illustrate the European and the 
African approaches outlined in chapters two and three. The case study on Denmark 
will be discussed to exemplify the deterrent policies employed by the European Union. 
It illustrates the cracks in the allegedly liberal ‘promised land’ that is Europe. 
Furthermore, it discusses the rise of right-wing populism and its effects on the 
treatment of refugees in Denmark.  
Secondly, the case example of Uganda is used to illustrate the African 
approach. While Uganda in no way represents the approach of the entire continent, it 
is used to illustrate the fact that developing countries are taking progressive and liberal 
approaches to refugee situations, at least on paper. Furthermore, given that the country 
has been praised repeatedly for its methods and granting of a broad spectrum of rights 
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to refugees, the central African country serves as a positive example that stands in 
direct contrast to the European case study. 
The objective of this chapter is to illustrate the differences in refugee 
management in one of the world’s richest countries versus one of its poorest countries. 
Furthermore, it will discuss the prevalence of deterrence occurring in both contexts, 
albeit arguably due to different circumstances and motivations. Furthermore, the 
national policies and laws framing the approach taken will be discussed in order to 
determine what long-term refugee management looks like in either context. Uganda’s 
self-reliance strategy will be analysed in an effort to assess whether it supports the 
achievement of durable solutions, particularly local integration, for refugees in the 
country.   
Chapter 5: Recommendations and Conclusions 
Finally, chapter five of this thesis will conclude and sum up its findings. It recaps the 
two approaches and the case studies used to illustrate them, making concluding 
remarks. In addition, recommendations will be made for both regions on how to better 




Chapter 2: The European Approach 
1.  INTRODUCTION  
This chapter focuses on the ‘European approach’, which implies the discussion of an 
approach to refugee management taken by the entire European continent. However, 
the emphasis will lie primarily on the territory of the European Union (EU), i.e., its 
member states and the policies or laws applicable to them. Therefore, the argument is 
made in the context of the EU rather than the continent as a whole. 
In recent years, Europe has been reported to have been ‘burdened’ by a mass 
influx of refugees and irregular migrants, often referred to in terms of a ‘crisis’ 
(Trauner, 2016: 319). While there is no official definition of what constitutes a ‘mass 
or large-scale influx’, according to the  Commentary on the Draft Directive on 
Temporary Protection in the Event of Mass Influx, it must be defined ‘in relation to 
the resources of the receiving country’ and ‘the expression should be understood as 
referring to a significant number of arrivals in a country, over a short time period, of 
persons from the same home country who have been displaced under circumstances 
indicating that members of the group would qualify for international protection’ 
(UNHCR, 2000). It further adds that large-scale or mass influx refers to groups of 
people ‘for whom, due to their numbers, individual refugee status determination is 
procedurally impractical’ (UNHCR, 2000). 
In 2015, this mass influx constituted the arrival of unprecedented numbers – 
about 1.5 million – of asylum seekers to EU territory (Den Heijer, Rijpma & 
Spijkerboer, 2016: 607).  The rhetoric surrounding the refugee inflow to Europe in 
recent years, however, obscures the reality that asylum applications declined 
significantly in the years following the initial peak (Schittenhelm, 2009: 229). 
Moreover, it has arguably drawn disproportionate attention given the fact that the 
number of refugees entering Europe since 2015 still remains relatively low if 
considered in the greater scheme of the global refugee population, the majority of 
which is outside the EU, often in countries bordering the respective conflict zone 
(Schittenhelm, 2009: 229).  
Den Heijer, Rijpma and Spijkerboer (2016: 607) have, therefore, argued that 
the recent migrant crisis is primarily a crisis of policy, not least because the number of 
refugees who entered the EU in 2015 constitutes no more than 0.3 per cent of the total 
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inhabitants3 of the territory. Despite this arguably small percentage in relation to the 
total number, the EU was unable to respond effectively to the arrival of thousands of 
people on the coasts of Italy and Greece, which ultimately caused the system to 
collapse. Schengen, the common visa system for EU countries, was jeopardized by 
unregulated movement of refugees within the EU, and the ability and willingness of 
member states to meet their obligations towards those in need was put into question 
(Den Heijer et al., 2016: 607). 
Furthermore, on a national level, the recent inflow of asylum seekers to Europe 
– primarily due to the ongoing war in Syria – has resulted in a certain breakdown of 
capacity or will to provide protection (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017: 104). European 
countries have increasingly introduced restrictive laws pertaining to refugees, 
including restrictions on family reunification, seizing of property, anti-Muslim policies 
or discouraging immigration all together (Troianovski & Duxbury, 2016). The 
introduction of such laws has been expedited even more with the re-awakening of 
right-wing ideology in countries throughout Europe, leading to a widespread rhetoric 
of intolerance, distrust and fear (HRW, 2019: 3). The sustained negative representation 
of refugees and resulting attitude towards them in the public sphere have provided a 
rationale for limiting acceptance and integration of refugees in many European 
countries (HRW, 2019: 1). Hence, more and more displaced persons are being rejected 
at borders or do not even reach them due to laws and deals being made with so-called 
transit countries, begging the question of potential violations of article 33 of the 1951 
Refugee Convention – the principle of non-refoulement – and other consequences of 
this seemingly deterrent approach (HRW, 2019: 2). 
More restrictive laws have been introduced at domestic level in numerous 
states, with even the most liberal becoming increasingly closed off to migrants and 
refugees. For instance, mandatory visas, carrier sanctions as well as other border 
control measures have become commonplace throughout member states (Guild et al.: 
2015: i). Scholars have argued that precisely these restrictions have established 
conditions under which people are forced to use the services of smugglers or other 
methods of irregular and unsafe travel to reach Europe (Guild et al.: 2015: i). A tragic 
consequence of the desperate attempts to reach Europe by those forcibly displaced 
 
3 508 million inhabitants (2015) 
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from their home countries and the unwillingness of European states to open their 
borders to asylum seekers is the high number of deaths in the Mediterranean. While 
studies from the 1990s reveal that few drownings occurred at the time, figures from 
recent years show that deaths in the Mediterranean Sea have increased significantly 
with about 600 people feared to have drowned in the first half of 2019 alone (Guild et 
al.: 2015: i; European Parliament, 2019). Given the events of recent years, it appears 
that displaced persons who make their way to Europe in need of protection and in 
search of a better life are faceless, viewed as numbers without names, voices or agency 
that threaten ‘the European way of life’ and the continent’s security. The response by 
so-called ‘liberal’ states has evidently been disappointingly illiberal (Khiabany, 2016: 
4). 
However, the ‘illiberal’ and restrictive response by some European countries 
has also been informed by international and EU-wide policies. The most important 
tool at regional level regulating refugee movements is the Common European Asylum 
System (CEAS), primarily in the form of numerous directives and the Dublin 
Regulation (Schmalz, 2017: 6). The following section will discuss these documents 
and the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan to illustrate the deterrent nature of the EU’s 
asylum law. 
2.  LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The legal framework for EU member states with respect to the treatment and 
management of asylum seekers and refugees is threefold. Legal obligations stem from 
complex and often overlapping laws and directives at international, regional and 
domestic level (Langford, 2013: 222). The basis of all regional and national laws 
relating to asylum can be found in international documents, specifically the 1951 
Refugee Convention, as well as customary international law (CIL). Furthermore, EU 
member states’ laws are informed by EU-level treaties or ‘primary EU law’ – the 
Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty; TEU) and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (Treaty of Rome; TFEU) – as well as case law 
from the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR), which is informed by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
Lastly, directives, regulations and decisions adopted by EU institutions which form 
part of the CEAS, otherwise referred to as ‘secondary EU law’, speak more specifically 
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to and give guidance on issues surrounding the reception and treatment of as well as 
the protection afforded to asylum seekers and refugees (Langford, 2013: 223). 
2.1 International 
The 1951 Refugee Convention together with its 1967 Protocol, to which all European 
countries are signatory, is the most widely recognised source of legal obligations 
pertaining to asylum and refugeehood. One of the most important provisions in the 
Refugee Convention is found in article 33 on non-refoulement, which prohibits the 
expulsion or return of an asylum seeker to a territory where his or her life or freedom 
may be threatened (UN, 1951). While states are not explicitly required to grant 
protection to refugees, it has been argued by the UNHCR as well as experts in the field 
that article 33 implies certain procedural safeguards that must be observed (Langford, 
2013: 226). Safeguards include access to an asylum procedure with the guarantee of 
an objective analysis of the human rights situation in other countries (Langford, 2013: 
226). Moreover, refoulement refers not only to direct returns to a country where an 
individual may face ill-treatment but also to indirect refoulement, i.e., being returned 
to a country that may then go on to send the individual to a third country where there 
is a risk of torture or ill-treatment, among other things (Langford, 2013: 226). 
Despite the lack of an option to sign reservations to article 33, thereby making 
it applicable to all signatory states, interpretation of this article differs from region to 
region and country to country. Given this chapter’s focus on refugee management in 
the EU and ‘accusations’ of repeated violations of article 33 in recent years, the EU’s 
interpretation of it is worth considering in more detail. 
2.2 Regional 
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (hereafter EU Charter), proclaimed by the 
European Union in 2000, explicitly refers to the right to asylum in article 18. Its status 
was altered to become legally binding when the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force 
(European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights [FRA], 2013: 21). Consequently, 
EU member states and institutions must – according to article 51 – act in adherence to 
the EU Charter when implementing EU law. In addition to a specific provision for the 
right to asylum, article 19 of the EU Charter addresses the principle of non-refoulement 
(FRA, 2013: 21). Articles 47 and 52, while not explicitly mentioning asylum seekers 
or refugees, also appear to be relevant in the broader context of migration, providing 
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for the right to an effective remedy and fair trial as well as minimum protection 
provisions as outlined by the ECHR, respectively (FRA, 2013: 21). The right to 
effective remedy and a fair trial are also mentioned repeatedly throughout numerous 
directives that speak more specifically to asylum seekers and migrants. 
Judgements passed by the CJEU and the ECtHR are also relevant to the 
European asylum system. The CJEU has a broader set of competencies than the ECtHR 
in that it has the right to decide on failures to act by EU institutions under the relevant 
EU law and the validity of EU acts as well as to adjudicate matters on the infringement 
of EU law by member states (FRA, 2013: 19). 
The ECtHR, which was adopted by the Council of Europe in 1950, adjudicates 
matters to ensure that states observe their obligations under the ECHR (FRA, 2013: 
15). The right to asylum is not mentioned under the ECHR. Nevertheless, issues 
surrounding migration have resulted in significant case law from the ECtHR, primarily 
in relation to the prohibition of torture, the right to liberty and security, the right to 
respect for private and family life or the right to an effective remedy (FRA, 2013: 16). 
In extreme cases, issues under article 2 – the right to life – may be raised when it comes 
to removal or expulsion. 
2.2.1 Common European Asylum System 
The Common European Asylum System (CEAS) was completed in 2005 and reformed 
twice between 2011 and 2014 with the aim of protecting the rights of those seeking 
asylum. It was established in adherence to article 78 of the TFEU, which notes the 
importance of respecting states’ obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention 
(FRA, 2013: 35). 
The introduction of one common system was motivated partly by the desire to 
curb ‘asylum shopping’, as it is argued that movement of asylum seekers within the 
EU is related to perceived or real differences in the attractiveness of member states. 
Besides the interest of physical safety, other factors such as the presence of family and 
existing asylum communities, linguistic and colonial links, perceptions of the 
economic reality, openness to receiving and integrating migrants as well as the selected 
country’s migration policies all play determining roles (Den Heijer et al., 2016: 608). 
Furthermore, Schapendonk (2012: 30) noted that a destination is often chosen during 
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the migration process as a result of information provided by the media or advice from 
human traffickers. 
However, the EU can only address and mitigate the disparities between 
member states to a limited extent and cannot influence some significant determining 
factors at all (Den Heijer et al., 2016: 609). Furthermore, others argue that different 
levels of attractiveness of member states do not always present a significant problem, 
as can be seen from the example of Germany and its quota system where 
socioeconomic factors play a deciding role (Den Heijer et al., 2016: 610). In Germany, 
a quota of refugees is calculated for each federal state, taking such factors into 
consideration as population size and tax revenue. On that basis, refugees tend to be 
allocated to relatively wealthy regions with low unemployment (Den Heijer et al., 
2016: 610).  
Implementation of asylum procedures and reception in EU member states has, 
however, differed significantly, creating an uneven system across its 27 states. Hence, 
a common asylum system is not synonymous with a uniform system, with one single 
asylum procedure and the same refugee status across all member states (Mitsilegas, 
2014: 181). Despite having aimed at harmonising the system and thereby levelling the 
playing field, asylum applications continue to be determined at a national level, with 
individual national procedures and outcomes (Mitsilegas, 2014: 181). Consequently, 
recognition rates as well as procedural standards, reception conditions and the content 
of protection continue to differ from country to country (Den Heijer et al., 2016: 609). 
In Sweden, for instance, a refugee is permitted to take on employment immediately 
after applying for asylum, while in Germany this is only possible after three months, 
in the Netherlands after six months and in France only after nine months (Den Heijer 
et al., 2016: 609). With easy access to such rights in certain countries compared to 
others, it is understandable why issues like ‘asylum shopping’ arise. Hence, in order 
to mitigate such occurrences, it may be beneficial to have a more uniform and equitable 
system as opposed to simply a common one. 
2.2.2 Dublin Regulation 
The Dublin Convention or Regulation is one of the most integral parts of the CEAS. It 
was first established in 1990, reformed and replaced by Dublin II in 2003, and again 
in 2013 by Dublin III. While slight changes were made to the original Dublin 
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Convention with each reform, this thesis will refer to all three versions simply as the 
Dublin Regulation. Dublin II was adopted in accordance with the Maastricht Treaty 
and the Tampere Conclusions as a mechanism to ease the allocation of responsibility 
for asylum procedures (Langford, 2013: 223). The Dublin Regulation is binding on all 
EU member states except Denmark which opted out with the introduction of Dublin 
III, as well as on three non-member states4 (Langford, 2013: 223). 
The Dublin Regulation is considered by numerous scholars as ‘the root of the 
problem’ preventing a fair and functional European asylum system (Regulation No 
604/2013, 2013: para 42). It aims to rapidly determine the EU member state 
responsible for the asylum claim in order to ensure access to effective and time-
efficient status determination procedures (Regulation No 604/2013, 2013: para 42). In 
addition, it serves as a safeguard to prevent exploitation of the asylum system by 
applicants endeavouring to make claims in multiple member states (Regulation No 
604/2013, 2013: para 42). In general, the responsible state is the one through which 
the applicant first entered the territory of the EU, i.e., the country of first arrival. 
However, instead of efficiency and effectiveness, the introduction of this new 
mechanism has caused serious issues in the protection of asylum seekers. In addition, 
it has led to a considerable imbalance, with high numbers of refugees remaining in the 
country of first entry. Consequently, countries such as Italy, Greece and Spain, which 
are closest in proximity to refugee-producing countries, are left with responsibility for 
a disproportionately high number of refugees (Schmalz, 2017: 7). 
Nevertheless, while the state of first arrival is generally the criterion used for 
determination, it is not the primary criterion according to Dublin II. The regulation 
states that the most important factors in assigning responsibility to a country are 
preference for family unity and prior issuing of entry documents (Langford, 2013: 
224). Furthermore, Dublin II provided a clause that allows for divergence from the 
first country of arrival rule in article 3 (2). It notes that a member state may decide 
under the ‘Sovereignty Clause’ to process the asylum claim itself for ‘political, 
humanitarian or practical reasons’ (Langford, 2013: 225). The regulation, however, 
also notes that all EU member states are considered ‘safe third countries’ simply by 
virtue of respecting the principle of non-refoulement and, therefore, transfers back to 
 
4 Iceland, Norway, Finland 
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the country of first arrival should not be an issue. Nevertheless, article 3 (2) has been 
invoked several times since the refugee influx to Europe following the Arab Spring in 
2011, leading to intense debates and severely impacting mutual trust between the 
member states (Langford, 2013: 225). The ‘Sovereignty Clause’ was subsequently 
removed with the introduction of Dublin III. 
Furthermore, the system of allocation outlined in the Dublin Regulation is 
completely different to those in individual member states, such as the quota system in 
Germany. It presumes a level playing field according to which conditions are the same 
everywhere, thereby disregarding the preferences of asylum seekers (Den Heijer et al., 
2016: 610). Special provisions are only in place for unaccompanied minors and asylum 
seekers who want to join family members already residing in one of the member states. 
Consequently, asylum seekers are essentially coerced into submitting applications for 
asylum in particular places, which has occasionally resulted in disobedient behaviour 
on the part of the applicant (Den Heijer et al., 2016: 610). For instance, reports and 
studies have made mention of such behaviour as avoiding registration, falsifying the 
travel route or even cutting off fingertips (Den Heijer et al., 2016: 611). 
To conclude, while the Dublin Regulation was by no means designed as a 
solidarity measure to distribute responsibility for asylum seekers equitably among EU 
member states, it appears to have effectively become a barrier to achieving solidarity 
in any form (Guild et al., 2015: 1). 
2.2.3 Directives 
Aside from the Dublin Regulation, the CEAS also comprises numerous directives that 
aim at providing a harmonious system throughout EU member states regarding refugee 
management and protection. However, the vagueness of provisions therein and the 
choice to opt out of directives have resulted in large differences in their application 
across countries.  
While the Qualification Directive is said to significantly improve the 
compliance of EU law with standards set out in international human rights and refugee 
law, other directives have been criticised greatly. For instance, the ‘safe third country’ 
provision found in the Asylum Procedures Directive (2005: art. 27) and lack of a clear 
definition for this term have resulted in a failure to provide sufficient safeguards for 
those already in a vulnerable position (UNHCR, 2004). Furthermore, the Asylum 
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Procedures Directive allows for the deportation of rejected asylum seekers before the 
outcome of their appeal is known, essentially preventing them from accessing their 
right to an effective remedy should an error have occurred (UNHCR, 2004). This 
provision is particularly problematic given the fact that, in some EU countries, 30 to 
60 per cent of applicants were only granted refugee status after having appealed the 
initial decision (UNHCR, 2004).  
The Reception Conditions Directive faces similar issues in that it has largely 
failed to achieve what it set out to do, with overcrowding and administrative burdens 
often leading to significant delays in registering asylum claims (European Council on 
Refugees and Exiles [ECRE], 2015: 6). The Asylum Information Database (AIDA) 
has noted that the Reception Conditions Directive is being used as a migration control 
tool, leading states to neglect humanitarian concerns resulting from the withdrawal or 
reduction of material reception conditions (AIDA, 2018: 2). 
Finally, the Return Directive was put in place as a mechanism to ensure that 
fundamental rights are upheld when returning migrants to their countries of origin, a 
transit country or another third country – most importantly the principle of non-
refoulement (Directive 2008/115/EC, 2008: art. 3 (3)). However, the directive lacks 
any provision for overseeing whether returns are safe, dignified and sustainable. Due 
to the absence of monitoring mechanisms, it is impossible in many cases to know 
whether refoulement has occurred (ECRE, 2009: 7). Moreover, the provision 
governing entry bans under article 11 has been widely criticised for contributing to the 
criminalisation of migration (Platform for International Cooperation on 
Undocumented Migrants [PICUM], 2015: 7). 
3.  SHORTCOMINGS  
As noted above, the European Union’s rules on asylum do not set harmonised 
standards, despite being revised and reformed on multiple occasions. The most recent 
reform in 2018 arguably took into consideration the gaps identified during the 2015 
migrant crisis. Directives introduced between 2011 and 2014 approximated further by 
introducing a uniform status and common procedure. However, the basic principle 
allowing member states to introduce or retain more favourable provisions remained 
(Directive 2011/95/EU, art. 3; Directive 2013/33/EU, art. 5; Directive 2013/32/EU, 
art. 4). Therefore, EU law essentially only sets a threshold to be met by the national 
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legislation of the individual member states, evidently giving too much leeway and 
providing loopholes for states to avoid taking their equal share of responsibility.  
One of the biggest issues identified within the current EU system is that each 
member state is essentially left to fend for itself, no matter how many people come to 
claim asylum. Due to the Dublin Regulation, for instance, Greece was left solely 
responsible for the thousands of asylum seekers who crossed the border into its 
territory from Turkey (Den Heijer et al., 2016: 612). Due to the unmanageable inflow 
of refugees, Greece had to organise its own ‘relief’ by not registering asylum seekers 
and thereby incentivising them to secondary migration (Den Heijer et al., 2016: 612). 
However, other member states along the route – Slovenia, Hungary and Austria – 
resorted to the same methods, failing in their duties and in applying the Dublin 
Regulation (Den Heijer et al., 2016: 612). 
The failure of the EU asylum system and the Dublin system in particular is 
eloquently summarised by Rainer Bauböck (2018) in his paper on ‘Refugee Protection 
and Burden-Sharing in the European Union’. He argues that, despite the EU offering 
the best possible conditions for an effective regional refugee protection regime, under 
real world circumstances institutional failures of ‘Europeanising’ refugee policies are 
hindering this potential from being realised (Bauböck, 2018: 142). Bauböck highlights 
that, first and foremost, the Dublin Regulation’s ‘country of first arrival’ rule should 
be abandoned. Only then can a more equal European system of asylum registration 
and determination be realised that takes the importance of burden sharing into 
consideration (Bauböck, 2018: 142). 
Furthermore, besides hindering effective burden sharing, the Dublin system, in 
particular its transfer to countries such as Greece, also effectively results in breaches 
of the principle of non-refoulement (Mink, 2012: 121). Due to its geographical 
location, Greece has repeatedly served as the country of first entry for a large number 
of asylum seekers making their way to the EU. However, it is argued that the return of 
refugees to certain EU member states, such as Greece, constitutes a violation of the 
principle of non-refoulement. This has not only come to light with the recent refugee 
crisis, but former Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Thomas 
Hammarberg (2010) noted that ‘the gravely dysfunctional asylum procedures in 
Greece have brought the Dublin system to a genuine collapse’. In the past 10 years, 
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countless cases have been brought before the ECtHR regarding the Dublin system.5 
For instance, the court established in 2009 in S.D. v. Greece and Tabesh v. Greece that 
the detention of asylum seekers occurring in the Mediterranean country was in 
contravention of article 3 of the ECHR. In response to this judgement, some EU 
member states, such as Finland and the Netherlands, suspended transfers back to 
Greece between 2005 and 2010. However, corresponding measures at EU level could 
not be and were not implemented, leaving the southern European country flooded with 
asylum applications once again (Mink, 2012: 122). 
A second issue lies in that there is no way to make the rights associated with 
refugee status uniform in the EU with the current state of affairs, despite it being 
proclaimed as such in various policy documents. Refugee status should entitle people 
to the same treatment as nationals in certain areas, such as education, health care and 
welfare, according to articles 22, 23 and 24 of the 1951 Refugee Convention (UN, 
1951) as well as articles 27, 29 and 30 of the Qualification Directive. As these public 
services are administrated independently at national level and are outside the remit of 
the EU, uniformity of refugee status in the Union is arguably unattainable (Den Heijer 
et al., 2016: 610). 
Lastly, another structural weakness of the EU’s asylum policy is the lack of 
implementation of the EU directives on asylum in the national laws and practices of 
its member states (Den Heijer et al., 2016: 610). The process of implementation is 
greatly challenged by diverging procedural traditions, distinct administrative 
environments and a differing understanding of the role of the judiciary throughout the 
member states. Uniform implementation in national law of the provisions set out in 
the directives, therefore, interferes with the contrasting national understandings and 
conceptions (Den Heijer et al., 2016: 610). 
The relationship between the different levels of laws applicable to European 
countries with regard to asylum seekers and refugees – international law, primary and 
secondary EU law, and domestic law – in conjunction with the country of first arrival 
rule set out in the Dublin Regulation has severely strained EU solidarity and prevented 
the asylum system from functioning properly. Major structural issues within the 
 




system have been identified, giving merit to the claim made by such scholars as Den 
Heijer et al. that the recent refugee crisis is a crisis of policy more than anything else. 
Despite the principle of non-refoulement being considered as a cornerstone of refugee 
law, it is argued that EU asylum law is not wholly in line with this norm (Mink, 2012: 
120). Instead of attempting to ameliorate the system within the EU in order to provide 
better protection to the displaced persons arriving on its shores, the EU as a whole as 
well as its member states independently have increasingly implemented measures to 
extra-territorialise migration control. Hathaway and Gammeltoft-Hansen (2015: 250) 
refer to the deterrent measures implemented as ‘cooperation-based non-entrée’, while 
Carrera (2019: 4) describes the approach as one of ‘contained mobility’. 
4.  ‘COOPERATION-BASED NON-ENTRÉE’,  ‘CONTAINED MOBILITY’ OR 
DETERRENCE 
A predominant feature of European asylum policy has been to ensure good relations 
with countries outside the EU. While it may simply appear to be a foreign policy 
method to maintain good relations with countries bordering the territory, such 
agreements indicate a further step towards deterrence (Bauböck, 2018: 142). The EU 
and its member states have sought to ensure methods and put into place policies that 
facilitate the return of asylum seekers and refugees to transit countries outside its 
territory. Furthermore, besides frequently attempting to return refugees and asylum 
seekers to third countries, European states have also sought cooperation with 
neighbouring countries to first prevent departure from these countries but also to stop 
people who may subsequently aim to travel onward to Europe from entering these 
‘transit countries’ all together. As mentioned above, this approach has been referred to 
as ‘cooperation-based non-entrée’ or ‘contained mobility’. 
Den Heijer, Rijpma and Spijkerboer (2016: 620) note that Italy has sought to 
cooperate with Libya in the form of bilateral agreements since the early-to-mid 2000s. 
These agreements made the provision of aid to Libya subject to Libya halting 
migration to Italy (Davitti & La Chimia, 2017: 10). Italy has frequently concluded 
bilateral agreements with countries with questionable human rights records, most 
recently seeking a strategic partnership with Sudan in 2016 to further externalise 
migration control (Davitti & La Chimia, 2017: 10). Moreover, since the outbreak of 
the war in Syria, transit countries of refugees on their way to Europe – Algeria, Egypt, 
Libya, Morocco and Tunisia – have introduced visa requirements for Syrian nationals, 
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possibly due to pressure from the EU (Den Heijer et al., 2016: 620). It can be assumed 
that this hindrance to accessing the migration route from the Libyan coast to Italy 
resulted in Syrian refugees attempting to cross into EU territory using the eastern 
Mediterranean route through Turkey and Greece (Den Heijer et al., 2016: 620). 
Turkey, however, announced that Syrians will only be admitted to the country directly 
from Syria (Den Heijer et al., 2016: 621). Furthermore, reports soon followed stating 
that at least two border crossing points had been closed (Amnesty International, 2016). 
4.1 European Migration Agenda 2015 
The European Agenda on Migration (hereafter European Agenda) was introduced by 
the Commission in 2015 in response to the large number of deaths among migrants 
crossing the Mediterranean as well as other irregular and unsafe methods of attempting 
to migrate to Europe (Davitti & La Chimnia, 2017: 1). The European Agenda proposed 
both internal and external policy measures and rests on four main pillars: (1) reducing 
the incentives for irregular migration; (2) border management – saving lives and 
securing external borders; (3) Europe’s duty to protect: a strong common asylum 
policy; and (4) a new policy on legal migration (European Commission [EC], 2015: 6-
16). While the European Agenda claims to focus primarily on its duty to protect those 
in need, it appears that the actions taken in line with its framework reveal a clear 
emphasis on methods to externalise migration management (EC, 2015: 7). Methods 
relating to pushbacks at sea and the closure of land borders have been criticised 
repeatedly. Using development aid as a tool for migration control, however, has 
remained largely unchallenged and is considered as a ‘lesser evil’ (EC, 2015: 2). 
Similar to Italy’s agreements with Libya, this method of managing migration is 
generally implemented by the EU providing aid funds tied to the condition that asylum 
seekers be returned to partner countries, such as Turkey, Afghanistan and Sudan (EC, 
2015: 2). A recent example of such an agreement is the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan. 
4.2 EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan 
The EU has increasingly sought to cooperate with Turkey to mitigate migration into 
its territory. Therefore, the Commission announced a plan, termed EU-Turkey Joint 
Action Plan (hereafter Action Plan), aimed both at helping Syrians in Turkey and at 




The Action Plan, implemented in March 2016, notes the importance of 
solidarity, togetherness and efficiency in tackling common challenges, such as the 
refugee crisis. Furthermore, it highlights the centricity of human dignity in the joint 
endeavour agreed upon by the EU and Turkey, an EU candidate country (EU-Turkey 
Joint Action Plan, 2015: 1). The first aim of the Action plan, ‘addressing the root 
causes leading to the massive influx of Syrians’, is to be addressed by the EU 
mobilising new funds, predominantly through the EU Trust Fund, while Turkey has 
committed to continue to providing international protection to refugees fleeing from 
the war zone (Den Heijer et al., 2016: 635). 
Furthermore, the Action Plan implies a commitment to burden sharing in 
addressing the crisis. While the EU agreed to provide Turkey with support in 
combating irregular migration and migrant smuggling, Turkey arguably made a 
significantly bigger commitment in agreeing to first strengthen its interception 
capacity but also to ‘smoothly readmit irregular migrants’ who entered the EU via 
Turkey (EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan, 2015: 2). To avoid overburdening the country 
and in the interests of cooperation and burden sharing, one Syrian was to be resettled 
from Turkey to the EU for every Syrian returned to Turkey. However, there is no clear 
stipulation as to which Syrians would benefit from being resettled to the EU from 
Turkey, which member states would accept resettled Syrians, nor what legal status 
they should have (Den Heijer et al., 2016: 635). 
Since adoption of the Action Plan, irregular entry to Europe via Turkey has 
dropped by more than half since 2016. Yet, reports on its implementation have 
revealed numerous legal issues. First of all, it can be argued that the deal violates the 
right to seek asylum, established in article 14 of the UDHR (1948) and reiterated in 
the Declaration on Territorial Asylum (1967) as well as the  Vienna Declaration on 
Human Rights and Programme of Action (1993). While this right does not create a 
duty for states to grant asylum, it does create an obligation for the signatory states to 
assess asylum applications, which is violated by obstructing the opportunity to lodge 
an application in EU member states. 
Furthermore, the fact that ‘all new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into 
the Greek islands as of 20 March 2016 [were to be] returned to Turkey’ suggests 
instances of collective deportation – a violation of article 4 of Protocol 4 to the ECHR 
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(Den Heijer et al., 2016: 635). It is precisely due to violations of international law that 
the aforementioned section of the deal has presented itself as the most challenging to 
implement. Finally, critics have also highlighted that the EU turned a blind eye to the 
fact that Turkey does not constitute a safe country to which refugees and asylum 
seekers can be returned (Amnesty International, 2017: 6). This issue is particularly 
problematic in that it appears to violate one of the cornerstones of international refugee 
law, the principle of non-refoulement. 
In conclusion, the deal had clear benefits for European states, externalising 
their borders and reducing the overall number of refugees arriving in their countries. 
At the same time, however, refugees suffered from the effects of the deal. The 
provisions of the deal can, therefore, be said to be in violation of international human 
rights law and universally agreed norms of refugee protection (Long, 2018). 
5.  CONCLUSION  
An article in the German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine referred to the European 
Union’s asylum law as ‘Schönwetterrecht’ (fine weather law), meaning a law 
established at a time in which asylum seekers were a marginal issue (Hailbronner, 
2015). Its implementation is entirely in the hands of the member states, given that the 
EU lacks executive powers and there is no common or uniform asylum law nor federal 
asylum courts (Den Heijer et al., 2016: 623). Member states have opposed the 
formation of a European border guard and are unwilling to bestow executive powers 
on the European Asylum Support Office (EASO). Its capacities only extend as far as 
assisting member states’ national asylum authorities (Den Heijer et al., 2016: 623). 
The multi-level governance existing in the EU presents significant vulnerabilities, in 
particular concerning asylum, as national interests tend to deviate from those of the 
Union. Consequently, cooperation is difficult to achieve and disparities between 
member states are significant (Den Heijer et al., 2016: 624). 
The measures discussed above have shown a clear leaning by the EU and its 
member states towards managing migration outside the confines of its territory. In so 
doing, however, numerous examples of breaches of the non-refoulement principle by 
the EU and its member states have been identified. More often than not, the breaches 
appear to result from the excessive application of ‘ill-defined, dubious devices’ such 
as the concepts of ‘safe country of origin’ or ‘safe third country’ (Mink, 2012: 121). 
33 
 
Furthermore, as noted above, push-back operations, especially in the shape of 
interception and return of asylum seekers crossing the Mediterranean, have become 
more and more widespread (Mink, 2012: 121). While such operations officially target 
stopping the business of smugglers and traffickers in the Mediterranean, they may 
ultimately result in asylum seekers being returned to countries where they may be at 
risk of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (Davitti & La Chimia, 
2017: 6).  
The provision of development aid in return for preventing the spill-over of 
refugees into the territory of the European Union appears to be somewhat of a loophole 
in efforts to extra-territorialise migration management due to a lack of international 
aid regulation (Davitti & La Chimia, 2017: 20). General acceptance of the deal 
between the European Union and Turkey arguably poses a significant risk to the future 
of refugee protection in that it has essentially outsourced border control in exchange 
for funds and political gestures (Long, 2018). Whether the EU’s ‘more for more’ 
approach is termed ‘cooperation-based non-entrée’, ‘contained mobility’ or simply 
deterrence is irrelevant. Methods of externalising border control through agreements 






Chapter 3: The African Approach 
1.  INTRODUCTION  
This chapter will discuss the ‘African approach’ to refugee management. It aims to 
illustrate the general approach to refugee management taken on the African continent 
in contrast to the ‘European approach’ discussed in chapter two. A distinction between 
the African Union (AU) and the African continent as a whole is not necessary as all 
countries on the continent as well as the waters surrounding it are member states of the 
AU. Consequently, when speaking of the ‘African approach’ to refugee management, 
this thesis refers to all African countries and the legislation and policies regarding 
refugeehood and asylum applicable to them. 
Africa is one of the main refugee-generating but also refugee-hosting regions 
in the world (Rutinwa, 2002: 14). The humanitarian crises in Africa are many and the 
numbers of people across the continent who are forced to flee their homes is constantly 
increasing (Maunganidze, 2018). Official numbers show that about 85 per cent of the 
global refugee population is hosted in Africa (Maunganidze, 2018). Bonaventura 
Rutinwa has classified the nature of refugee policies in post-independence Africa into 
two periods. Initially, policies exhibited a generous attitude towards forcibly displaced 
persons, both collectively and from individual countries (Rutinwa, 2002: 12). With 
adoption of the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee 
Problems in Africa (hereafter OAU Convention) in 1969, African states are said to 
have implemented a so-called ‘open-door policy’ across the continent. The policy and 
legal framework outlined by the OAU Convention was specifically aimed at 
addressing the security concerns of states and preventing large numbers of refugees 
from fuelling subversive inter-state disputes (Rutinwa, 2002: 16). People in search of 
safety and security were generally readily admitted, with refoulement being a rare 
occurrence (Rutinwa, 2002: 12). 
The extended refugee definition found in article 1 (2) of the OAU Convention 
came in particularly handy for refugee movements in the 1960s and 1970s as the 
majority of all independent countries in the southern part of the continent admitted 
forcibly displaced persons from countries still struggling against colonialism and 
apartheid, or in terms of the OAU Convention, ‘occupation, foreign domination, or 
events seriously disturbing the public order’, and were, therefore, eligible for refugee 
35 
 
status (Rutinwa, 2002: 16). Furthermore, despite the norm at the time being a policy 
of encampment, Rutinwa states that refugees enjoyed security and self-sufficiency 
rights that were adequate and ensured their dignity (Rutinwa, 2002: 12). Generally, the 
camps were big enough to enable refugees to obtain a piece of land, which in turn 
facilitated their engagement in economic activities without having to be entirely 
dependent on aid (Rutinwa, 2002: 19). Moreover, movement in and out of camps was 
not as rigid as it is today, and refugees were able to leave the camp and settle elsewhere 
in the country, either temporarily or permanently (Rutinwa, 2002: 19). When settling 
outside the camps, self-sufficiency rights for refugees were also liberal, allowing them 
to cultivate land and keep animals. Refugees were also granted equal access to health 
and education services, the job market and, in some countries, to social welfare 
(Rutinwa, 2002: 19). Finally, Rutinwa (2002: 12) adds that, in the 1960s and 1970s, 
durable solutions were recognised for their importance, leading to concerted efforts to 
integrate locally, naturalise legally, repatriate voluntarily and find resettlement 
opportunities in third countries together with the UNHCR. This ‘golden age’ of asylum 
in Africa can be said to reflect the general spirit of ubuntu and cooperation employed 
and enshrined in policies on the continent, aiming to strengthen African unity 
(Rutinwa, 2002: 16). 
However, the late 1980s were witness to a marked shift in Africa’s refugee 
protection policies, retreating from the fundamental principles of international refugee 
law (Rutinwa, 2002: 20). Despite the number of refugees having increased, the 
commitment to asylum by African states decreased. The ‘open-door policy’ of the 
1960s and 1970s was replaced by calls for ‘safe zones’6 to give protection to forcibly 
displaced persons within their country of origin so that they do not cross borders and 
‘burden’ other states (Rutinwa, 2002: 12). For example, the Government of Tanzania, 
in a policy paper on the creation of safe zones in November 1995, noted that ‘it [will 
serve] as a constant reminder to their Governments that the refugees are in fact their 
citizens and, therefore, they have a natural duty towards them’ (Rutinwa, 2002: 21). 
The policy paper also noted that host countries should not be burdened with a problem 
 
6 The governments of states in the Great Lakes region called for the creation of ‘safe zones’ within 




that is not of their own making and that ‘safe zones’ will facilitate easier return to the 
refugees’ homes once the situation stabilises (Rutinwa, 2002: 21). 
In addition, refoulement in the form of rejection at borders and being returned 
to a less than safe environment in the country of origin became routine. Even those 
who managed to flee to another country and obtain refugee status were rarely granted 
their rights to physical security, dignity and material safety (Rutinwa, 2002: 20). While 
previously having considered and worked towards all three of the UNHCR’s proposed 
durable solutions, depending on which was most applicable to a given situation, the 
emphasis and preference clearly shifted to repatriation – voluntary or not – at the 
earliest opportunity, often without regard to the situation in the country of origin 
(Rutinwa, 2002: 13). This, however, appears to be in direct violation of the principle 
of non-refoulement enshrined in article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention (UN, 
1951) and article 2 (3) of the OAU Convention, as well as article 5 (1) of the latter, 
which addresses voluntary repatriation (OAU, 1969). 
Today, except for some humanitarian agencies – most of which are grossly 
underfunded – little attention is paid to the situation of millions of refugees in Africa. 
However, the UNHCR noted that African countries are stepping up to the challenge of 
refugee protection and asylum provision by keeping borders open, protecting refugees 
and developing strategies to adequately manage large-scale influx, albeit while battling 
their own political and socio-economic difficulties (Maunganidze, 2018). Uganda has 
been praised repeatedly for integrating refugees into the community and allowing them 
access to farming land. Furthermore, Ethiopia, while already hosting millions of 
forcibly displaced persons, still continues to welcome thousands of refugees every year 
(Maunganidze, 2018). Both of the aforementioned countries form part of the 15 
countries7 that have begun to roll out the Comprehensive Refugee Response 
Framework (CRRF) since the adoption of the New York Declaration on Refugees and 
Migrants (hereafter New York Declaration) in September 2016 (Global Compact on 
Refugees Platform, n. d.). The New York Declaration, the CRRF, and the Global 
Compact on Refugees, among other legislative texts, will be discussed in more detail 
in the following section in order to establish the nature of the current ‘African 
approach’ to refugee management. By analysing the legal instruments applicable to 
 
7 Seven out of the 15 countries piloting the CRRF are in Africa. 
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the region, this chapter aims to illustrate that, largely by virtue of the system itself and 
lack of capacity in conjunction with the vast number of refugees, the overarching result 
of efforts towards local integration usually is still deterrence, albeit more indirect or 
less intentional than in Europe. 
2.  LEGAL FRAMEWORK  
The legal framework for African countries regarding the treatment and management 
of refugees and asylum seekers is again threefold, having to consider international, 
regional as well as domestic laws and directives. The overarching document with 
respect to refugees is the 1951 Refugee Convention, which all African countries, bar 
Libya and South Sudan, have ratified.8 The African regional counterpart to the 1951 
Refugee Convention is the OAU Convention, which was ratified by 45 of the 54 AU 
member states.9 
2.1 International 
The 1951 Refugee Convention was initially only applicable to refugeehood in relation 
to ‘events occurring in Europe prior to 1951’ (UN, 1951). Its scope was expanded with 
the 1967 Protocol, which removed the temporal and geographical limitation. 
Furthermore, the 1951 Refugee Convention includes an option to make declarations 
and reservations in order to encourage broad participation (UN, 1951; UN, 1967). 
Signatories are permitted to modify their obligations, with a few exceptions. In order 
not to undermine the purpose of the 1951 Refugee Convention, certain integral 
humanitarian objectives as well as some executory provisions and final clauses cannot 
be modified by signing reservations (Blay & Tsamenyi, 1990: 534). These central 
humanitarian objectives are said to be the cornerstones of international refugee law 
and are set out in articles 1, 3, 4, 16 (1) and 33 (UN, 1951). Nevertheless, since 
adoption of the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, numerous other 
provisions have attracted reservations. 
The articles subject to reservations are wide-ranging. While all reservations 
signed must be considered, given the focus of this thesis, this section will briefly 
discuss reservations signed by African countries to articles of chapter 3 relating to 
 
8 Madagascar is only party to the 1951 Refugee Convention but not its Protocol of 1967. 
9 not ratified: Djibouti, Eritrea, Madagascar, Morocco, Mauritius, Namibia, SADR, Somalia, Sao 
Tomé & Principe 
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gainful employment, article 26 on the freedom of movement and article 34 regarding 
naturalization. 
Chapter 3 of the 1951 Refugee Convention addresses gainful employment as 
either wage-earning employment (art. 17), self-employment (art. 18), and liberal 
professions (art. 19). Of these three, article 17 has had reservations signed to it most 
frequently, which generally state that the provisions regarding wage-earning 
employment will be considered simply as a recommendation (UN Treaty Collection, 
1954). 
Article 26 on the freedom of movement of refugees has attracted the attention 
of several signatory states, primarily from the African continent due to failure of the 
1951 Refugee Convention to address issues of security and subversion (Blay & 
Tsamenyi, 1990: 552). Reservations often refer to restricting movement and settlement 
of refugees ‘whenever considerations of national security or public order so require 
[or make advisable]’. Problems of national security usually arise on two levels. Firstly, 
if the host country shares a border with the country of origin, the settlement of refugees 
must be assessed carefully in order to avoid border incidents (Blay & Tsamenyi, 1990: 
551). This concern is addressed in article 2 (6) of the OAU Convention, noting that 
‘for reasons of security, countries of asylum shall, as far as possible, settle refugees at 
a reasonable distance from the frontier of their country of origin’ (OAU, 1969). 
Secondly, the concentration of a large group of refugees in a particular province may 
lead to social tensions with citizens of the host country, which can in turn pose a risk 
to public order. Consequently, due to the reservations signed to article 26, a contracting 
state may place refugees in refugee camps or concentrate them in particular provinces. 
The encampment approach, however, is generally frowned upon as this often results 
in violations of basic human rights and may, therefore, arguably defeat the 
humanitarian objective of the 1951 Refugee Convention (Blay & Tsamenyi, 1990: 
552). 
Finally, article 34 addresses the question of naturalization, stating that 
‘[C]ontracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and 
naturalization of refugees’ (UN, 1951). While the wording departs from a clear legal 
obligation, this article appears to impose at least a moral obligation to integrate 
refugees in the host country. While the states that signed reservations permit 
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naturalization of aliens in their national legislation, the reservations to ensure that no 
favourable treatment is given create an additional obstacle to refugees achieving 
durable solutions (Blay & Tsamenyi, 1990: 542). 
The fact that many reservations have been signed by African countries 
illustrates why the 1951 Refugee Convention has repeatedly been criticised for not 
taking needs and circumstances that are specific to the African context into 
consideration. Given the shortcomings of the 1951 Refugee Convention with regard to 
Africa, it is important to take a closer look at the regional frameworks in place. 
2.2 Regional 
As mentioned above, the regional response to refugees and asylum seekers in Africa 
has its legal foundation in the OAU Convention. It was adopted by the Organisation 
of Africa Unity (now African Union) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in 1969 in response to 
the realisation that the 1951 Refugee Convention did not adequately address and 
engage with Africa’s needs, and it is the only legally binding regional refugee law 
instrument (Naldi & D’Orsi, 2014: 127). The OAU Convention therefore sought to 
engage with displacement, for example, caused by the struggle for liberation, by 
drought and famine, or by apartheid in an African context. It does not seek to replace 
or exclude the operation of the 1951 Refugee Convention from the African continent, 
but rather to complement it, not least because the refugee definition in the 1951 
Refugee Convention was considered inadequate to address Africa’s specific problems 
(Naldi & D’Orsi, 2014: 127). Furthermore, the OAU Convention has been applauded 
for expanding the existing scope of protection for refugees. While including the 1951 
Refugee Convention definition in article 1 (1) of the OAU Convention (1969), it 
expands on it in article 1 (2), stating that: 
The term ‘refugee’ shall also apply to every person who, owing to 
external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously 
disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin 
or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in 
order to seek refuge in another place outside his country or origin or 
nationality. 
Hence, the OAU Convention definition includes those in need of 
complementary international or subsidiary protection. In particular, the qualification of 
‘events seriously disturbing public order’ reflect the definition’s broadness and 
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flexibility as may be interpreted to cover warlike situations or massive violations of 
human rights not covered by the 1951 Refugee Convention definition (Schreier, 2014: 
79). There is very little jurisprudence to date on the OAU Convention’s refugee 
definition, in particular on the extended part (Schreier, 2014: 76). In addition, no 
definition is provided for the various terms used, leaving it open to interpretation. 
Although there is no clear definition as to what constitutes ‘events seriously disturbing 
public order’, the OAU Convention’s preamble emphasises the need for a humanitarian 
approach. Therefore, its provisions should be interpreted broadly (Schreier, 2014: 81). 
It must be noted that the expanded refugee definition is based on objective events that 
cause a refugee to flee. This stands in contrast to the subjective element of the well-
founded fear of persecution standard found in the 1951 Refugee Convention definition 
(Schreier, 2014: 86). Hence, it appears that the expanded refugee definition of the OAU 
Convention allows for a greater scope of protection than the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
Yet, Edwards has argued that use of the word ‘compelled’, for example, may introduce 
an element of subjectivity and thereby some ambiguity into article 1 (2) of the OAU 
Convention that could result in unlawful rejection of refugees making legitimate claims 
(Edwards, 2006: 229-30). Nevertheless, its significance in extending the scope of 
refugee protection should not be negated, despite the OAU Convention definition not 
being entirely objective. 
Furthermore, the peaceful and humanitarian nature of asylum and the 
importance of respecting the rule of non-refoulement is reiterated in the OAU 
Convention (Kamanga, 2002: 26). Article 2 notes that ‘no person shall be subjected by 
a Member State to measures such as rejection at the frontier, return or expulsion, which 
would compel him to return to or remain in a territory where his life, physical integrity 
or liberty would be threatened […]’ (OAU, 1969). It goes further in its restriction on 
forcible return by expressly prohibiting ‘rejection at the frontier’, which some scholars 
consider equal to a right to asylum in Africa according to Okoth-Obbo (2001: 89). 
However, Rose D’Sa and others argue that states’ discretion in admitting persons to 
their territory remains intact, contending even that the weight on domestic law in the 
OAU Convention’s asylum provision may in fact result in a state establishing 
conditions that could defeat the purpose of the convention all together (Okoth-Obbo, 
2001: 89). This disagreement is arguably settled in the African Charter on Human and 
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Peoples’ Rights (hereafter Banjul Charter), which states in article 12 (3) that ‘every 
individual shall have the right, when persecuted, to seek and obtain asylum in other 
countries’ (OAU, 1981). It again includes a qualification noting the necessity of being 
‘in accordance with the laws of [the potential host country] and international 
conventions’ (OAU, 1981). Nevertheless, despite this possibly fuelling the debate on 
the exact quality of this right once again, it clearly adds and, in turn, strengthens African 
asylum policy. 
Finally, the question of determining refugee status in the African context 
illustrates some differences. Despite regional legal instruments not expressly 
mentioning group refugee status determination, the norm in Africa appears to have 
been just that (Edwards, 2006: 205-6). Increasing efforts towards more individual 
status determination have been made in recent years, not least due to continuous 
encouragement by the UNCHR for states to implement effective national asylum 
laws, so-called humanitarian fatigue induced by the real or perceived economic, 
political and social costs of hosting refugees for extended periods of time, as well as 
the heightened risk of people not in need of international protection being granted 
refugee status as a result of mixed migration flows (Edwards, 2006: 205-6). 
Nevertheless, Edwards notes that the majority of refugees in Africa are granted group 
or prima facie status (Rankin, 2005: 416). The nature of group or prima facie status 
adds an additional layer of difficulty to refugee management, given that the rules and 
rights awarded tend to differ from those of refugees who have undergone individual 
status determination. 
Particularly in African countries, the arrival of refugees on a large scale is 
common. Developing appropriate responses to such mass influxes, however, has been 
a challenge to global refugee policy for decades, responded to by establishing group 
determination of refugee status on a prima facie basis (Rutinwa, 2002: 1). Refugee 
status on a prima facie basis denotes the ‘recognition by a State of refugee status on 
the basis of the readily apparent, objective circumstances in the country of origin 
giving rise to the exodus’  (UNHCR, 2001), or ‘in the absence of evidence to the 
contrary’ (UNHCR, 1979). It was formulated in order to ensure ‘admission to safety, 
protection from refoulement and basic humanitarian treatment to those patently in need 
of it’ (UNHCR, 1979). However, states do not simply resort to prima facie status 
determination when there is a large number of refugees arriving in a country at a given 
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time, but rather when its refugee status determination (RSD) procedures are 
overwhelmed. Hence, prima facie RSD is not necessarily contingent upon a specific 
number, but is also applied if the capacities of the potential host country are exceeded 
(Albert, 2010: 7).  
The UNHCR Background Paper prepared for the Global Consultation on 
International Protection states that prima facie status determination is widely applied 
in Africa and Latin America, despite its not being mentioned explicitly in any 
international legal instrument pertaining to refugees (Albert, 2010: 12). Albert further 
notes that neither the Executive Committee of the UNHCR nor the travaux 
préparatoires of the 1951 Refugee Convention have mentioned the term as relevant 
(Albert, 2010: 12). Hence, in the absence of an authoritative statement on prima facie 
refugee status determination, refugees experience a vague legal status and, in turn, only 
vague protections and rights (Albert: 2010: 12). Only four countries have incorporated 
the term prima facie into their domestic refugee instruments, three of which are in 
Africa: Kenya, Sierra Leone and Burundi. However, Albert notes that mention of the 
term is not consistent throughout the instruments, thereby somewhat contorting its 
meaning (Albert, 2010: 27). 
Frequently, the status of refugees in camps is determined on the basis of the 
group, as opposed to urban refugees who more frequently face individual assessment 
(Edwards, 2006: 206). The difference in determination procedure, however, also 
entails differences in access to rights and durable solutions. For example, prima facie 
status makes provision for voluntary repatriation and local integration, but not for 
resettlement to a third country (Albert, 2010: 16-7). On the other hand, urban refugees 
who have undergone individual assessment are more likely to access resettlement 
opportunities. This is based on the fact that Western countries participating in 
resettlement programmes insist on cases being assessed individually, among other 
things (Edwards, 2006: 206). Moreover, collective status determination may 
sometimes also lead to serious restrictions on accessing rights, as was found by the 
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (now Human Rights First) in 1995 (Edwards, 
2006: 206). While group status determination was introduced for good reasons, the 
fact that it leads to such discrepancies with regard to accessing rights and eligibility 
for different durable solutions is a reason for concern, given that the lack of access to 
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rights for people awarded refugee status on a prima facie basis may constitute indirect 
refoulement, thereby serving as an indirect deterrent mechanism. 
3.  SHORTCOMINGS  
Despite being lauded for its inclusive nature and broadened scope of the refugee 
definition, the OAU Convention has not proven – perhaps not surprisingly – to be the 
answer to all refugee problems on the African continent. Rankin notes that scholars 
and analysts, however, rarely engage with the shortcomings of the OAU Convention, 
but generally limit themselves to singing its praises (2005: 410).  
As mentioned above, a major issue identified is that the different reasons listed 
for being granted refugee status are not elaborated on in any sense, creating substantial 
vagueness and ambiguity (Rankin, 2005: 407). Hence, they are left open to 
interpretation, which often turns out to be narrow, potentially leading to a less 
favourable outcome for the applicant. This issue is further frustrated by the fact that 
no systematic travaux préparatoires have ever been published, giving little or no 
insight on the origins and legislative history of the OAU Convention, as is available 
for the 1951 Refugee Convention (Okoth-Obbo, 2001: 86).  
Furthermore, the refugee question in Africa – much like elsewhere in the world 
– has frequently been influenced by political and security issues (Okoth-Obbo, 2001: 
90). In his legal review on the OAU Convention in 2001, Okoth-Obbo (2001: 90) notes 
that major rights-related problems encountered by African foreigners, refugees in 
particular, in other African countries are rarely dealt with by legal forces. He adds that, 
while the importance of legal imperatives should not be diminished, they have been 
significantly less decisive than the political and international relations tools that often 
take precedence over legal ones (Okoth-Obbo, 2001: 90). Consequently, great value 
lies within the quest set out by the drafters of the OAU Convention, in the context of 
security politics and international relations, to depoliticise, humanitarianize, and 
cohere the refugee question and the granting of asylum in particular (Okoth-Obbo, 
2001: 90). 
Nevertheless, the security-driven nature of refugee politics comes to light in 
particular when considering policies of encampment for refugees established in 
numerous countries in Africa and the lack of protection within such settings. The fact 
that African countries are often confronted with large-scale influxes of refugees begs 
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the question of how states can respond appropriately to the need for international 
protection in practice. While individual refugees generally decide to self-settle, factors 
such as how many refugees can realistically and effectively be incorporated within the 
society of the country of asylum, the practicalities surrounding the provision of 
immediate basic needs for refugees, as well as curbing potential threats to security in 
the host country have led many countries to establish camps (Bakewell, 2014: 118). 
However, scholars such as Crisp and Jacobsen10, Van Damme11, and Hovil12 
agree that the encampment of refugees is objectionable (Bakewell, 2014: 117). Camps 
segregate refugees from the general population, reinforcing the role of the nation state 
as the primary authority over refugees’ fate and ensuring that they are maintained as a 
group subject to being managed (Bakewell, 2014: 117). Yet, policy and practice 
usually bring us back to the camp. Encampment has remained the central pillar of 
refugee policy throughout Africa and Asia, despite statistics showing that only a 
minority of refugees in a country actually settle in camps, while the majority opt for 
self-settlement (Bakewell, 2014: 117).  
As mentioned above, the rationale for putting refugees in camps is generally 
based on ease of provision as well as the politics of aid, security, and capacities of the 
host state. However, evidence shows that refugees often remain in camps for extended 
periods, with the camps essentially becoming permanent structures resembling a city 
suburb or village (Bakewell, 2014: 119). Hence, the supposed temporariness of 
refugeehood is put into question. Furthermore, the mere nature of camps also hinders 
effective implementation of durable solutions because the economic opportunities 
available to refugees in camps, for instance, are generally strictly controlled by the 
state in order not to overwhelm the capacity of the local area. This is arguably in 
conflict with article 34 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, which provides for states to 
‘as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees’ (UN, 
1951). The durable solution of local integration is thereby established in international 
refugee law. 
 
10 see ‘Refugee Camps Reconsidered’, Forced Migration Review, Vo. 3 (1998). 
11 see ‘Do Refugees Belong in Camps: Experiences from Goma and Guinea’, Lancet, Vol. 346, No. 
8971 (1995). 
12 see ‘Self-settled Refugees in Uganda: An Alternative Approach to Displacement?’, Journal of 
Refugee Studies, Vol. 20, No. 4 (2007). 
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While the camp may offer somewhat of a welfare safety net, living in a camp 
often results in restrictions on movement, access to resources and business activities, 
and ownership of assets (Bakewell, 2014: 121). In addition, restrictions on the 
movement of refugees prevents them from exercising their right to freedom of 
movement. However, as discussed above, several African countries have signed 
reservations to article 26 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, reserving the right to 
monitor movement of refugees and settle them in a certain area. Moreover, there is 
little incentive for host states to let refugees move outside the sphere of camps and 
integrate them locally as aid for refugees only lasts as long as the refugees are visible. 
Consequently, the history of practice and the politics of aid have largely contributed 
to making encampment the default policy for refugee management (Bakewell, 2014: 
121).  
While not being an explicit deterrent to refugees, the policies of encampment 
chosen by several African countries contradict the temporary nature of refugeehood 
by preventing any opportunity to implement durable solutions aside from repatriation. 
In addition, the violations of basic human and refugee rights occurring in camps can 
be argued to result in deterrence, denying the displaced the required protection and 
chance to lead a dignified life. 
4.  A NEW ERA OF RESPONSIBILITY-SHARING AS A DURABLE SOLUTION? 
So what is the current ‘African approach’ to refugee management? Despite the OAU 
Convention having been praised widely, several shortcomings have been identified in 
the continent’s refugee policies. Rutinwa (2002: 15-20) argued that refugee policies in 
post-independence Africa can be classified into two distinct periods: the era of the 
‘open-door policy’ followed by a period signified by a retreat from the fundamental 
principles of international refugee law. Almost two decades later, the number of 
refugees on the continent continues to rise and conditions do not appear to be 
improving. Countries are overwhelmed by the large numbers of displaced persons 
within their territory, resulting in asylum applications being rejected, a lack of access 
to rights, and refugees having to live in undignified conditions with little prospect of 
accessing durable solutions. However, by signing the New York Declaration and the 
Global Compact on Refugees (hereafter Refugee Compact) as well as piloting its 
Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF), countries are making efforts 
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to ameliorate refugee management in Africa in order to achieve long-term, durable 
solutions and enhance the sharing of burden and responsibility. 
The international agreements signed in recent years are not the first to address 
the question of burden and responsibility sharing in refugee protection. The 1951 
Refugee Convention touches on the topic of burden sharing and, therefore, the need 
for international cooperation in its fourth preambular paragraph (UN, 1951). 
Furthermore, this issue is addressed in the substantive clauses – article 2 (4) – of the 
OAU Convention (1969), stipulating that: 
Where a Member State finds difficulty in continuing to grant asylum to 
refugees, such Member State may appeal directly to other Member States 
and through the OAU, and such Member States shall in the spirit of 
African solidarity and international cooperation take appropriate 
measures to lighten the burden of the Member State granting asylum. 
Inclusion of this provision has been lauded repeatedly. However, the absence of an 
elaboration on what such ‘appropriate measures’ would be has resulted in a lack of 
enforceability and, therefore, of effective implementation. Moreover, when looking at 
the numbers and distribution of refugees on the African continent – a phenomenon 
Hathaway attributes to ‘accidents of geography’ (Hathaway & Neve, 1997: 117) – as 
well as the added factors of poverty, difficulties with structural adjustments and effects 
of international debt, the effectiveness of article 2 (4) is put into question (Okoth-Obbo, 
2001: 92). Hence, there has been no success in turning the OAU Convention’s 
provision of burden sharing into reality (Okoth-Obbo, 2001: 92). On the other hand, 
there has been widespread consensus regarding the implementation of a ‘legal and 
administrative machinery for burden-sharing’ (Okoth-Obbo, 2001: 93). A step towards 
such a mechanism was taken with adoption of the New York Declaration and the 
Refugee Compact. 
4.1 The New York Declaration and the Global Compact on Refugees 
The New York Declaration, agreed upon unilaterally by all 193 UN member states, 
was the product of a series of debates on approaches to responsibility sharing, among 
other things, at the UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants in 2016. It notes in 
paragraph 68 that international cooperation is central to the refugee protection regime 
and recognises the ‘burdens that large movements of refugees place on national 
resources, especially in the case of developing countries’ (New York Declaration, 
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2016). Acknowledging this reality, a commitment to sharing the burden and 
responsibility of hosting and supporting refugees was made by the signatory states 
(New York Declaration, 2016: para 68). However, the New York Declaration lacks 
clarification on states’ responsibilities and what equitable burden sharing would be. 
Therefore, how to put the principle of responsibility and burden sharing into practice 
was given particular attention in drafting of the Refugee Compact. 
The Refugee Compact was signed in 2018 and initially bore the title Global 
Compact on Responsibility Sharing for Refugees, highlighting the issue of 
responsibility and burden sharing in refugee management (UN, 2016). The process of 
negotiations and drafting contrasted sharply with the introduction of increasingly 
restrictive policies throughout the global north. Nevertheless, it had the potential to 
better define states’ responsibilities in the context of refugee protection, taking a step 
away from considering refugees to be a burden and emphasising their position in 
society as integrated, right-holding members of host communities (Khan & Sackefyio, 
2018: 697). Yet, it must be noted that neither the New York Declaration nor the 
Refugee Compact are legally binding documents. Hence, their provisions are merely 
treated as recommendations that may inform the domestic policies adopted by 
signatory states but impose no obligations. Nonetheless, the fact that 181 countries 
voted in favour of the Compact, with only two against (Hungary and the USA) and 
three abstaining (Eritrea, Libya and Liberia), shows the overall consensus by the 
international community on the issues addressed in the Refugee Compact. 
Despite many African countries having ratified international as well as regional 
legal instruments aimed at the protection of refugees and human rights, their 
implementation in practice leaves much to be desired. According to Khan and 
Sackefyio, however, the Refugee Compact may potentially offer a light at the end of 
the tunnel (Khan & Sackefyio, 2018: 696). A dominant feature of the Refugee 
Compact is its emphasis on international solidarity and cooperation among a much 
broader range of participants than in refugee protection so far. Alongside national and 
local authorities, the ‘relevant stakeholders’ include international and regional 
organisations, humanitarian and development actors, international and regional 
financial institutions, civil society, academics, the media, as well as the refugees 
themselves (Global Compact on Refugees [GCR], 2018: para 3). Furthermore, its four 
core objectives – informed by a human rights approach and an emphasis on sustainable 
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development – are to (1) ease pressure on host countries and communities, (2) enhance 
refugee self-reliance, (3) expand access to third-country solutions, and (4) support 
conditions in countries of origin for the return of refugees in safety and dignity (GCR, 
2018: para 7; Khan & Sackefyio, 2018: 697). These objectives, in particular regarding 
durable solutions, build on article 2 (4) and article 5 of the OAU Convention, 
acknowledging that refugee-hosting countries in Africa often have to accommodate 
numbers of refugees that are far beyond their capacities (Khan & Sackefyio, 2018: 
697). Insufficient resources have frequently resulted in states failing to afford socio-
economic rights to refugees. The Refugee Compact aims to mitigate this issue by 
addressing protection and development simultaneously (Khan & Sackefyio, 2018: 
697). Khan and Sackefyio  (2018: 697) note that African refugee host countries stand 
a much better chance of achieving equitable responsibility sharing and cooperation, 
and thereby the Refugee Compact’s four core objectives, by implementing the CRRF 
as well as the sustainable development approach. 
The Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) forms part of the 
Refugee Compact and is designed to strengthen the abilities of host countries to deal 
with large numbers of refugees as well as protracted situations. It offers a mechanism 
for the implementation of refugees’ rights, a strategy to meet targets, as well as a 
system to measure the outcomes (Khan & Sackefyio, 2018: 697). In addition, correct 
implementation of the CRRF together with the whole-sector financial support offered 
by the Refugee Compact creates an opportunity for refugee self-reliance through 
multi-sector aid and economic as well as institutional sustainability (Khan & 
Sackefyio, 2018: 697). 
Seven African countries – Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda 
and Zambia – have already rolled out the CRRF, which has resulted in strengthening 
of refugee institutions, increasing resilience within refugee communities, integration 
into host communities, as well as progress on legislation governing refugee rights 
(Khan & Sackefyio, 2018: 698). However, while mechanisms for self-reliance have a 
positive effect on the lives of refugees as well as their relationship with the host 
community, they must not be confused with a change of status, traditionally considered 
as the only durable solution to refugeehood (Khan, 2019: 209).  
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The Refugee Compact takes past approaches into consideration, 
acknowledging that naturalisation has not been favourable for developing countries 
and aiming to create greater access to resettlement while still promoting the preferred 
solution – voluntary repatriation (Khan, 2019: 209). Furthermore, it opens the door to 
more self-determination for refugees in protracted situations in camps, giving them an 
opportunity to become more economically independent. Hence, the Refugee Compact 
advocates more refugee self-reliance, a model which has been adopted in several 
African countries with varying success. Ethiopia, for instance, adopted a new Refugee 
Proclamation in 2019 promising a much more liberal regime with regard to refugees’ 
freedom of movement and right to work, and Rwanda has strengthened the provision 
of identity documents (Crawford & O’Callaghan, 2019: 10). Furthermore, Kenya, 
Uganda and Ethiopia have all committed to reviewing and amending policies 
regarding freedom of movement and access to labour markets (Crawford & 
O’Callaghan, 2019: 10; Intergovernmental Authority on Development [IGAD], 2019). 
While this shows signs of progress, the legal and practical obstacles to achieving 
refugees’ true self-reliance remain. 
To conclude, although efforts are being made towards liberalising refugee 
policies and facilitating self-reliance, their implementation still shows significant 
shortcomings, due not least to the lack of capital and resources in the countries affected 
(Khan & Sackefyio, 2018: 698). Consequently, external investment remains 
imperative to achieve long-term, positive changes and facilitate self-reliance and 
responsibility sharing as a solution to refugeehood. 
5.  CONCLUSION  
Despite being hailed for its liberal, expanded refugee definition, the focus on taking a 
humanitarian approach to the refugee problem and re-emphasising the importance of 
respecting the rule of non-refoulement, experts such as Kälin (1996) and van Selm-
Thorburn (1997) have interpreted the OAU Convention as being geared towards 
temporary protection, ultimately resulting in repatriation (Rutinwa, 2002: 20). In 
contrast to such interpretations, however, many African countries have allowed 
forcibly displaced persons arriving in their territory to remain as long as the reason for 
their flight persists. Some even made way for refugees to integrate into new 
communities and settle locally (Rutinwa, 2002: 20). Nevertheless, the provision of and 
access to rights in order to live a dignified life are significantly lacking. As a result, 
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refugees in Africa often have no real choice. Few are eligible for resettlement, while 
others choose voluntarily to return to their country of origin even though the situation 
that caused their flight may still persist. Both of these options have proven to be largely 
inadequate for the African context (Khan, 2019: 211).  
Much hope has been placed in the Global Compact on Refugees. As discussed 
above, scholars see much potential for it bringing significant improvements to the 
asylum system in the developing world. However, it is still early to assess its full 
impact. Its non-binding nature and consequent lack of enforceability will likely be an 
obstacle to widespread and uniform implementation of its provisions. Nevertheless, 
presenting self-reliance and responsibility sharing as an alternative to the solutions 




Chapter 4: Case studies 
Context-specific approaches and prospects for long-term refugee 
management and durable solutions 
1.  INTRODUCTION  
Chapters two and three have discussed the disparate approaches to refugee 
management with regard to the legal framework in two regions of the world: Africa 
and Europe. An analysis of relevant legislation was given as well as a discussion of its 
shortcomings regarding effective refugee management from a human rights 
perspective. While there are many similarities, not least due to most countries in both 
regions having ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention, significant differences in the 
regional frameworks were also identified. The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate 
what refugee management looks like in a domestic context by means of two case 
studies – one from each region. The countries selected as case studies are Denmark 
and Uganda. Denmark was chosen because, alongside other Nordic countries, it has 
been hailed as a liberal frontrunner for decades with regard to its policies on issues 
surrounding asylum and refugee protection. However, the 2015 migrant crisis showed 
Denmark in a different light and revealed that it has been moving towards deterrent 
policies since the early 2000s. Furthermore, Uganda has frequently been quoted as 
being ‘Africa’s poster child’ regarding refugee management, particularly given its self-
reliance strategy (SRS) and piloting of the CRRF as proposed in the Refugee Compact 
of 2018. However, implementation of the aforementioned policies show significant 
shortcomings in long-term refugee management and, in turn, achieving durable 
solutions. 
This chapter will set the context by giving a brief overview of the refugee 
situations in Denmark and Uganda, respectively. Next, approaches to refugee 
management in the two countries based on the respective domestic legislation will be 
discussed. Finally, the effects these approaches have on long-term refugee 
management and the potential for durable solutions will be analysed, with specific 
focus on deterrence – a theme identified primarily in the European context – and on 




2.  CONTEXT 
Even though Denmark does not have an extensive history of hosting refugees, it has 
been celebrated historically as a liberal frontrunner for its asylum policy and approach 
to refugee protection (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017: 99). Its open-armed mindset to 
finding a solution to global refugee problems was first illustrated when Denmark not 
only chaired the negotiations that led to the introduction of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention but was also the first country to sign and ratify it (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 
2017: 99). Furthermore, together with other Nordic countries, Denmark has been a 
major donor to the UNHCR as well as an established and committed member of its 
Executive Committee (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017: 99). This involvement illustrates an 
interest in tackling issues surrounding refugeehood and protecting the displaced. 
However, further investigation shows that while Denmark recognises the importance 
of protecting the displaced, it endeavours to do so outside the confines of its own 
borders. 
Particularly in recent years, in response to the European ‘migrant crisis’, more 
and more explicitly restrictive measures have been emerging in Denmark, introducing 
different forms of deterrence – primarily indirect – or of ‘non-entrée’, as termed by 
Hathaway in 1992 (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017: 103). As illustrated in the discussion 
of the European approach in chapter two, employing policies of deterrence appears to 
have been the favoured approach by many states, especially in the global north. In the 
case of asylum and migration, Gammeltoft-Hansen (2017: 103) defines the term 
deterrence as ‘policies intended to discourage or prevent migrants and refugees from 
either arriving in the territory of a prospective destination state or accessing its asylum 
system’. Measures of indirect deterrence more specifically are aimed at making the 
asylum system and its protections as unattractive as possible, with the intended effect 
of pushing asylum seekers and refugees towards other countries (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 
2017: 100). 
The Ugandan case stands in marked contrast to Denmark. Uganda has been 
one of the principal refugee-hosting countries in sub-Saharan Africa since the late 
1950s. At the same time, however, it has also contributed to the global refugee 
population, largely resulting from Idi Amin’s rule in the 1970s and later due to the 
internal conflict with the Lord’s Resistance Army (World Bank Group, 2016: 1). Due 
to its geographical location in a seemingly constantly unstable region, Uganda has 
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given refuge every year to approximately 161,000 people, fleeing from persistent 
conflict and instability in their home countries, ever since its independence (World 
Bank Group, 2016: 1). As of March 2019, 1.24 million refugees had been registered 
in Uganda, primarily as a result of concurrent emergencies unfolding in neighbouring 
South Sudan, Burundi and the DRC between 2016 and 2018 (Crawford et al., 2019: 
4). Uganda now hosts the largest refugee population in Africa and the third largest 
globally (Crawford et al., 2019: 4). 
In the 1990s and early 2000s, the overall number of refugees in the country 
was temporarily reduced by two voluntary repatriation operations. Nevertheless, 
ongoing conflicts in neighbouring countries soon caused the numbers of displaced 
persons in Uganda to increase once again. Even though Uganda has often served as a 
safe haven for refugees from various neighbouring countries, its history of refugee 
protection is not entirely impeccable (Crawford et al., 2019: 6). For instance, the early 
1980s saw a period of forced mass repatriation of thousands of Rwandan Tutsis who 
were living in southwestern Uganda. This was largely in line with the general trend on 
the continent at the time – experiencing a shift away from the initial ‘open-door policy’ 
– as discussed in chapter three. The World Bank identified this period in Uganda’s 
history of refugee protection as a unique yet sad episode, putting a damper on the 
country’s otherwise ‘stellar record’ as a host country for the displaced (Crawford et 
al., 2019: 6). 
3.  REFUGEE MANAGEMENT –  DOMESTIC LEGAL FRAMEWORKS  
The approach to refugee management is based primarily on the domestic legislation 
and policies of the respective country. This section will discuss the domestic legal 
framework regarding refugees and asylum in Denmark and Uganda, respectively. 
While many parallels can be drawn on a macro-level simply because both countries 
have signed and ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention as well as other international 
agreements pertaining to refugee rights and human rights more broadly, a closer look 
at the domestic legal framework gives a clearer indication of the true nature of refugee 
management in these two countries. Furthermore, it will illustrate the parallels to as 
well as differences from the broader regional framework and approaches, which were 
discussed in the previous chapters. 
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3.1 Legal Framework – Denmark 
Denmark’s current immigration and asylum policy has its roots in the 1983 Aliens Act. 
It was introduced to replace the Foreigners Act of 1952 and focussed primarily on 
improving legal guarantees for foreigners, in particular asylum seekers (Gammeltoft-
Hansen, 2017: 101). Since its adoption, the Aliens Act has seen over one hundred 
amendments, the vast majority of which – 93 – were made in the past two decades. In 
the early 1980s, Denmark was not experiencing a significant inflow of refugees and 
acceptance rates were high. Consequently, political motivation for the Aliens Act was 
rooted in providing greater legal clarity with regard to asylum, family reunification 
and reasons for expulsion or cessation of refugee status (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017: 
101). However, the increasing movement of people and vast growth in numbers of 
refugees arriving in Denmark in recent years has led the Danish government to make 
continuous amendments to the 1983 Aliens Act, thereby illustrating the growing 
politicisation of the topic of migration and refugeehood (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017: 
102). 
The Aliens Act was initially considered a progressive, liberal policy document, 
among other things due to its expansion of the term ‘refugee’ as defined in the 1951 
Refugee Convention. It also includes the protection of ‘de facto’ refugees 
(Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017: 102). A de facto refugee is someone who is not recognised 
as a refugee in the framework of the 1951 Refugee Convention, but ‘who is unable or, 
for reasons recognised as valid, unwilling to return to their country of origin or country 
of nationality or, if they have no nationality, to the country of their habitual residence’ 
(EC, n.d.). Given the introduction of this broader spectrum of people qualifying for the 
right to asylum, a part of the drafting committee raised concerns that a larger number 
of people now ‘eligible’ to apply for refugee status may make controlling immigration 
in Denmark significantly more difficult (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017: 101). To maintain 
control over large numbers of refugees applying for asylum in Denmark, a plan to 
reject refugees at the border in case of mass inflow and a provision to deny asylum 
under specific circumstances were introduced. In addition, no legal entitlement to 
family reunification was added to the Aliens Act, leaving regulation of this aspect up 
to the Ministry of Justice (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017: 101). The introduction of such 
clauses, however, was highly criticised by other stakeholders, such as the Danish 
Refugee Council and the Danish Bar and Law Society, arguing that wide 
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administrative flexibility would undermine the legal standing of immigrants and 
asylum applicants as well as permitting the government to make far-reaching changes 
without requiring consent from parliament (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017: 101). As a 
result of mobilisation by numerous Danish civil society organisations, parliament 
eventually adopted a more lenient proposal for the Aliens Act, containing a positive 
right to family reunification and more extensive legal guarantees concerning the 
removal of asylum seekers from Denmark (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017: 102).  
Nevertheless, the 1983 Aliens Act was the first international legal document to 
introduce the ‘first country of asylum’ clause as well as a legislative provision on ‘safe 
third countries’ in 1986 (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017: 103-4). This gave leeway to allow 
rejections at the border prior to starting the official asylum procedure, essentially 
violating the principle of non-refoulement. The 1986 clause was soon reproduced in 
legislation across Europe and became known as ‘the Danish clause’ (Hunt, 2014: 504). 
This concept of the ‘first country of asylum’ was later adopted in the Dublin 
Regulation as the ‘first country of arrival’ rule, which, as discussed in chapter two, is 
one of the main hindrances to the European asylum system working in a fair and 
equitable way (Bauböck, 2018: 142). Furthermore, Denmark was one of the first 
countries to pass legislation on carrier liability, which came into force in 1989, as well 
as being among the first to post immigration liaison officers to transit countries in order 
to prevent onward travel by asylum seekers (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017: 104). The 
country has also actively contributed to joint operations run by the EU’s border agency, 
Frontex, to block onward migration in Europe (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017: 104). 
Finally, according to commentators, Denmark reached a major turning point in 
its asylum and immigration policy in 2001. The formation of a right-wing government 
with support from the Danish People’s Party signalled a change in the rhetoric, with 
the party being a driving force behind cuts in immigration to its territory (Gammeltoft-
Hansen, 2017: 107). 
3.2 Legal Framework – Uganda 
In contrast to the underlying tone of deterrence in Denmark’s refugee policies, current 
refugee laws in Uganda have been hailed as among the most progressive in the world. 
The country’s legal architecture with regard to refugee rights and human rights in 
general is nothing short of impressive. Alongside the 1951 Refugee Convention and 
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the OAU Convention, it has ratified many regional and international legal instruments 
since its independence, including the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(ACHPR, 1986), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 
1995) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR, 1987; Sharpe & Namusobya, 2012: 563). Besides being guided by the 
elaborate body of principles established in international and regional legislation, 
Uganda’s current policy on refugees and asylum seekers has been influenced by the 
presence of refugees in the country since the late 1940s (World Bank Group, 2016: 7). 
The first law passed in Uganda relating to foreigners, the Aliens Registration 
and Control Act (ARCA), made no distinction between ‘ordinary migrants’ and 
refugees (World Bank Group, 2016: 8). It was replaced by the Control of Alien 
Refugees Act (CARA) in 1960, which emphasised the control and regulation of 
refugees without regard to their human rights. The CARA served as the principal 
domestic legislation on refugees for over 40 years, but turned out to be completely 
incompatible not only with international and regional legal instruments Uganda has 
acceded to, but also with its 1995 constitution (World Bank Group, 2016: 8). 
The most recent domestic legislative document that was passed, the 2006 
Refugees Act (hereafter Refugees Act), reflects the progressive development of 
refugee law and policy (World Bank Group, 2016: 7). The Refugees Act entered into 
force in 2008, and regulations to operationalise it were passed in 2010, finally 
replacing the oppressive and archaic CARA of the 1960s (Sharpe & Namusobya, 2012: 
561). Today, the 2010 Refugee Regulations, introduced to guide implementation of 
the provisions set out in the Refugees Act, together with the 2006 Refugees Act form 
the basis of refugees’ rights in the country (Crawford et al., 2019: 4). According to the 
UNHCR (2018: 3), these two documents ‘unquestionably constitute[s] the most 
progressive refugee law in Africa’. 
They have brought significant changes to the process of refugee status 
determination (RSD) and ensure better protection of the rights of Uganda’s refugees. 
Furthermore, it is argued that the Refugees Act brought Uganda’s national refugee 
policies more in line with what is enshrined in the 1951 Refugee Convention as well 
as regional and international human rights law (Sharpe & Namusobya, 2012: 562). It 
expands on the OAU Convention’s refugee definition by adding a failure to ‘conform 
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to discriminating gender practices’ as grounds for persecution (The Refugees Act, 
2006: s 4d). However, it also adds an additional reason for exclusion on top of the 
three mentioned in the OAU Convention, excluding persons with dual citizenship from 
refugee status if they have not availed themselves to the protection of both countries 
of nationality (The Refugees Act, 2006: s 5d). Parts III and IV of the Refugees Act 
address administrative issues pertaining to the Refugee Eligibility Committee (REC) 
as well as procedures for RSD (The Refugees Act, 2006: s 8-17; Sharpe & Namusobya, 
2012: 566). Refugees’ rights and obligations are addressed in part V of the Refugees 
Act. The majority of the rights reflect articles 3 to 34 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, 
excluding ‘welfare rights’, not least because Uganda is struggling to provide housing, 
public relief and other aspects of social security for its own citizens (The Refugees 
Act, 2006: s 29-36). Furthermore, an important difference lies in the fact that all rights 
within the Refugees Act apply only to those recognised as refugees by the REC or on 
a prima facie basis under section 25 (Sharpe & Namusobya, 2012: 566). 
‘The most progressive refugee law in Africa’ enables refugees to obtain 
identity documents as well as birth, marriage, death and education certificates. 
Refugees can also own property and enter into contracts, which has allowed them to 
facilitate their own economic and social development, with Uganda profiting from it 
at the same time (World Bank Group, 2016: 2). According to the World Bank Group 
(2016: 2) assessment of May 2016, the positive impact of the aforementioned 
regulations are illustrated by the noteworthy volume of economic transactions between 
Ugandan nationals and refugees as well as the employment opportunities created by 
refugees for Ugandan citizens. 
Nevertheless, while the Refugees Act covers significant ground and is largely 
in line with Uganda’s regional and international obligations, shortcomings with regard 
to rights provision in practice and RSD have led to widespread and systemic violation 
of critical refugee rights (Sharpe & Namusobya, 2012: 562). These issues can 
constitute constructive or indirect refoulement. Hence, while the country’s laws may 
not directly restrict access to asylum nor directly violate the letter of international 
refugee law, the lack of access to certain rights may conflict with general human rights 
law, resulting in deterrence nonetheless (Gammeltoft-Hansen & Tan, 2017: 38). 
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4.  LONG-TERM REFUGEE MANAGEMENT  
Refugee status is intended to be temporary. However, the reality is often very different, 
with refugeehood frequently becoming protracted. This presents not only the 
international community but, more importantly, the host communities and the refugees 
themselves with significant challenges, primarily because efforts to achieve durable 
solutions and, consequently, an end to refugeehood are rare.  
As illustrated in the outline of the domestic legal frameworks in the country 
case studies, some form of deterrence appears to occur in both contexts. In particular, 
the Danish example is largely in line with the tendencies of the ‘European approach’ 
to refugee management, as identified in chapter two. At least on the surface, Uganda 
reflects policies in line with the early years of the ‘African approach’ and its open-
door policy. Yet, failures in rights provision as well as other challenges resultant from 
structural issues also indicate deterrent tendencies. 
This section will address deterrent politics and policies in both contexts. 
Furthermore, it will take a closer look at Uganda’s self-reliance strategy in an attempt 
to analyse its value in long-term refugee management and the ensuing prospects for 
durable solutions. 
4.1 Deterrence 
Deterrence is not a new development in refugee management. Since the 1980s, three 
different trends can be identified in deterrence policies implemented by states 
specifically in the global north. Firstly, governments began introducing legal measures 
to prevent asylum seekers who had already reached the territory of a potential host 
state from attaining refugee status, for example, by setting temporal limits to 
submitting asylum applications and introducing concepts such as ‘first country of 
arrival’, ‘safe third country’ and ‘safe country of origin’ (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017: 
103). In the 1990s, policies of deterrence shifted increasingly towards extraterritorial 
migration control as well as including private actors in the management of migration 
(Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2011). The most recent trend, while still retaining the methods 
of the 1980s and 1990s, has extended to destination countries cooperating with 
countries of origin and transit in an effort of deterrence. This can be seen, for example, 
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in Australia and its ‘Pacific Solution’13 as well as the EU’s efforts to come to 
agreements with common transit countries immediately neighbouring its territory, 
such as Turkey and Libya (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017: 103). The agreements made 
with transit countries or countries of origin generally link cooperation on border 
control to foreign policy issues on a broader scale, including transnational crime, 
development assistance, visa facilitation or trade privileges (Gammeltoft-Hansen & 
Hathaway, 2014: 20). 
Denmark has been actively involved in these developments over the years and, 
according to Gammeltoft-Hansen (2017: 103), played a clear role in inspiring other 
countries to follow similar policies of deterrence. While the literature on deterrence 
tends to focus primarily on measures by ‘big players’ in the international arena, such 
as the United States and the European Union, Denmark serves as an interesting case 
study with regard to deterrence as a means of long-term refugee management in non-
frontline states. 
As noted in the discussion on the legal framework, Danish legislation has 
shown a clear indication of deterrent policies for decades. However, Denmark’s liberal 
image has shifted most drastically in recent years, primarily as a reaction to the mass 
refugee inflow into Europe. Significant reforms were made to its Aliens Act, and new 
policies were introduced to make the country as unattractive as possible to potential 
asylum applicants, thereby pursuing a policy of indirect deterrence. Furthermore, the 
rise of right-wing populism in Danish politics has been identified as having a 
significant impact on the increasing development of deterrent refugee management 
policies in the country. 
4.1.1 Right-wing populism and its policies on refugee management  
In recent years, countries such as Austria, France and Germany have attracted 
increased media attention due to the election successes of radical right-wing parties. 
The reawakening of right-wing ideology in countries throughout Europe has led to a 
widespread rhetoric of intolerance, distrust and fear (Khiabany, 2016: 3). The 
sustained negative representation of refugees and the resulting attitude towards them 
in the public sphere has, to a certain extent, provided a rationale for limiting acceptance 
 
13 implemented from 2001 to 2007; Government of Australia’s policy of transporting asylum seekers to 




and integration of refugees to many European countries (Khiabany, 2016: 1). This, 
however, is not a recent development in Europe’s Nordic countries, where all but 
Sweden have had active participation by radical right-wing parties since the 1970s 
(Widfeldt, 2018: 1). Despite Nordic countries having long held a reputation of being 
tolerant, liberal and progressive, parties from the centre to the far right generally play 
a prominent role in changing public discourse surrounding issues such as migration 
(Widfeldt, 2018: 2). 
Danish politics have been experiencing a more obvious shift to the right since 
the early 2000s, with its People’s Party serving as a leading example for Sweden’s, 
Finland’s and Norway’s radical right (Widfeldt, 2018: 2). It is not only the ruling party 
that has been implementing and advocating increasingly restrictive policies. The 
opposition parties have also earned considerable criticism by seeming simply to have 
reacted to proposed policies rather than developing their own. Hence, as a consequence 
of the reactive nature of the opposition’s politics, the governing party has been able to 
set the agenda without much pushback (Humanity in Action Danmark, 2012). The 
Danish People’s Party (DPP) has largely shaped its anti-immigration agenda by 
promoting anti-Islam rhetoric as well as criticising what it has termed ‘pro-
immigration political correctness’ (Widfeldt, 2018: 3). Furthermore, it is argued to 
endorse ‘welfare chauvinism’ – a belief that social assistance should be made available 
to citizens but not to immigrants – essentially supporting a combination of immigration 
scepticism with a somewhat social democratic welfare agenda (Widfeldt, 2018: 6). 
While the DPP is considered the most radical of the Nordic right-wing parties, 
they all share an anti-EU stance (Widfeldt, 2018: 6). As discussed in chapter two, 
deterrence appears to be a trend throughout the EU and not unique to Denmark. Yet, 
it is important to note that the country took an additional step in deciding to opt out of 
EU cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs, including numerous EU-wide asylum 
policies, starting with rejection of the initial Maastricht Treaty in 1992, in order to have 
more leeway in creating its own policies (Adler-Nissen & Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2010: 
141). When EU member states voted to integrate their asylum, immigration, border 
control and civil law policies in 1997 in order to speed up the process of adopting the 
Amsterdam Treaty, Denmark and the United Kingdom resisted, resulting in Denmark 
opting out of all matters surrounding border control, civil law as well as immigration 
and asylum policy (Adler-Nissen & Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2010: 140). However, while 
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Denmark has consequently opted out of the Asylum Procedures, Reception 
Conditions, and Qualification directives, it still participates in other measures 
pertaining to asylum and immigration – the Returns directive, among others – despite 
its general opt-out (Adler-Nissen & Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2010: 144). Nevertheless, it 
is evident that Denmark applies a more restrictive approach in its refugee policy in 
particular than demanded by the EU’s minimum standards set out in its directives. For 
instance, the Qualification directive’s expansion of the scope of protection beyond that 
of the 1951 Refugee Convention definition does not apply to Denmark, which may 
result in asylum seekers having their application rejected if they apply in Denmark, 
despite EU law requiring them to be granted protection (Adler-Nissen & Gammeltoft-
Hansen, 2010: 149). 
While immigration has not always been part of the agenda of the DPP, it first 
became a priority in reaction to refugee influx following the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s 
(Widfeldt, 2018: 7). Today, the party’s manifesto reads that ‘Denmark is not a country 
of immigration and has never been [sic]. We will therefore not accept a multi-ethnic 
transformation of the country’ (Dansk Folkeparti, 2002). With this clear statement and 
the fact that the majority of refugees come from ‘ethnically distant cultures’ 
Denmark’s response to the 2015 ‘migrant crisis’ is hardly surprising. 
The country’s response to the large-scale inflow of asylum seekers to Europe 
has been twofold. On the one hand, much like Austria, Germany, Norway and Sweden, 
Denmark introduced temporary borders in January 2016 despite being part of the 
Schengen area (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017: 105). The temporary controls at land 
borders with Germany as well as maritime borders with Sweden have been extended 
several times, most recently in November 2019 to stay in place until 12 May 2020 (EC, 
n.d.). However, while additional border checkpoints may have a deterrent effect, they 
have not prevented asylum seekers from submitting claims to the Danish authorities at 
the country’s physical border (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017: 105). 
Policies of indirect deterrence to discourage asylum claims or divert them to 
other countries have, therefore, formed a large part of Denmark’s approach to refugee 
management. As mentioned previously, Denmark has introduced a wide range of 
policies since 2015 aimed at making the conditions for asylum seekers and refugees 
there less attractive (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017: 105). For instance, a ‘temporary 
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protection status’ was introduced for those displaced by armed conflict or general 
violence, providing residence permits for a period of one year, with cases being 
reviewed on a regular basis to evaluate protection needs (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017: 
105). Hence, this temporary protection status is granted on the basis of the ‘general 
situation’ in a country of origin rather than the risk of personal persecution, as was the 
case for many Syrian refugees in Denmark (Al Maleh & Ibrahim, 2019). Temporary 
or subsidiary forms of protection generally have fewer rights attached, falling short of 
the general requirements of international law, not least due to their not being included 
in the 1951 Refugee Convention (Hathaway, 2001: 45). Furthermore, withdrawal of a 
temporary protection permit in Denmark is easier than invoking cessation of or 
exclusion from refugee status as soon as the situation in the country of origin improves, 
even if it remains ‘serious, fragile and unpredictable’ (Al Maleh & Ibrahim, 2019). 
In addition, for Convention refugees, the duration of initial residence permits 
was reduced from five to two years. Access to family reunification has been removed 
for the first three years for people granted ‘temporary protection status’, bar special 
considerations (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017: 105). The number of possible grounds for 
detention of asylum seekers – outlined in articles 35 and 36 of the Aliens Act – has 
also increased. An amendment made to the Aliens Act in November 2015 allows for 
the declaration of ‘special circumstances’ by the Minister of Immigration and 
Integration when there is a large number of arrivals, which can result in suspension of 
some safeguards normally governing detention. Consequently, an option was 
introduced to waive the ordinary right to habeas corpus for asylum seekers who have 
been detained in cases of mass influx (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017: 105). 
Furthermore, there is a general consensus among political theorists that, in 
situations where citizens have been provided with security, liberty and a certain level 
of social welfare, a sense of moral duty is imposed upon said citizens towards those 
less fortunate, such as people who have been forcibly displaced and, therefore, are not 
able to enjoy such benefits (Bauböck, 2018: 142). Denmark, a country that provides 
its citizens with the aforementioned, can thus be categorised as a ‘welfare state’. 
Hence, the moral argument brings us to the conclusion that refugees arriving in 
Denmark should – resultant from these moral duties – enjoy assistance of some sort. 
While it would be inaccurate to claim that no assistance is provided, the laws 
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introduced in Denmark over the past three decades illustrate a retraction from 
honouring its moral duties (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017: 103). 
Since the beginning of the ‘migrant crisis’, social benefits for refugees have 
been cut by 50% and support for child care as well as pensions is calculated on the 
basis of the length of the refugee’s stay in Denmark at the time of application 
(Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017: 105). Furthermore, one of the newly introduced policies 
that attracted significant international media attention is the authority of the Danish 
police to search asylum-seekers and seize their assets and funds – the ‘jewellery law’ 
– with the reasoning of said funds covering costs related to accommodation and other 
benefits (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017: 105). The Danish authorities appear to be 
capitalising further on the refugees hosted by introducing fees for such applications as 
family reunification and permanent residence. In addition, language and employment 
requirements have been introduced for permanent residence, and its waiting period has 
been extended to six years (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017: 105). Hence, since certain 
restrictions and waiting periods have been put in place before employment can be 
taken up, the cuts in social welfare as well as the seizing of assets in Denmark hit the 
most vulnerable even harder, diminishing their chances of living a life in dignity. 
Finally, in order for the aforementioned policies to be successful in deterring 
unwanted refugees, Denmark had to make its ‘unwelcoming’ policies known to the 
target audience. Therefore, the Nordic country placed advertisements in newspapers 
of transit countries in the Middle East, informing and ‘warning’ potential applicants 
about its new and restrictive policies. Similar methods of ‘marketing’ a country’s 
deterrence policies have also been employed by countries such as Belgium, Norway 
and Australia (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017: 107). 
4.1.2 Deterrence as a consequence of systemic issues? 
Deterrent measures in Uganda seem to be less explicit than in Denmark and can be 
argued to be more directly related to structural issues in the country resulting from the 
economic and political realities. This, however, does not mean that deterrence in the 
Ugandan context is entirely unintentional or not part of Uganda’s approach to refugee 
management. 
The 1951 Refugee Convention provides for a right to freedom of movement, 
which is reiterated in section 30 (1) of Uganda’s Refugees Act. Thus, refugees are 
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permitted to move freely and settle anywhere in the country (World Bank Group, 2016: 
74). Refugee settlement in Uganda has two different forms. Either in official, gazetted 
settlements on plots of land reserved by the government specifically for hosting 
refugees, or as self-settlement, particularly in border areas and urban centres (World 
Bank Group, 2016: 5). The right to freedom of movement, however, can be restricted 
by the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), who may designate public lands for ‘local 
settlement and integration’ of recognised refugees, bar special permission to settle 
outside said areas (The Refugees Act, 2006: s 44). Settling in the gazetted settlements 
or camps is often portrayed as the more beneficial option, not least as the UNHCR 
humanitarian assistance programme and the government’s self-reliance strategy (SRS) 
are only available to registered refugees (World Bank Group, 2016: 74).  
In practice, only those living in gazetted settlements and the small number of 
registered, self-settled refugees are considered to be refugees (Hovil, 2007: 601). 
Therefore, unregistered and self-settled, forcibly displaced persons are not eligible for 
assistance within the Ugandan context. This, however, is in contravention of the 
country’s international and regional legal obligations according to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and the OAU Convention. The latter clearly states that anyone fleeing his 
or her country of origin or nationality due to ‘external aggression, occupation, foreign 
domination or events seriously disturbing the public order’ is a refugee (OAU, 1969: 
art. 1 (2)). Furthermore, even when an asylum application is lodged, the process can 
take up to two years. Consequently, although the recognition rate is high at 
approximately 95 per cent, those without official refugee status are left stranded 
without assistance or access to rights (Sharpe & Namusobya, 2012: 570).  
In theory, all refugees should have access to the same rights, whether they live 
in gazetted settlements or self-settle (Jacobsen, 2006: 280). In practice, the situation is 
very different, with governments only partly fulfilling their legal obligations if at all. 
Refugees who opt to live outside the camp structure and ‘self-settle’ frequently live 
closely together with Ugandan nationals, with whom their lives are often intertwined. 
In addition, some have established businesses, and many are able to support 
themselves (Hovil, 2007: 601). Nevertheless, self-settled refugees in Uganda face 
difficulties in accessing the right to work, education or health care. The right to work, 
for instance, is narrower than set out in the UDHR, ACHPR or the ICESCR, restricting 
it to recognised refugees only and in accordance with the provisions for ‘aliens 
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generally in similar circumstances’ (Sharpe & Namusobya, 2012: 577). The 
qualification of ‘aliens generally in similar circumstances’ has led to confusion with 
regard to permission to take up gainful employment. The 2010 Regulations aim to 
clarify this by noting that ‘recognised refugees shall exceptionally be exempt from any 
requirement to pay any charges or fees prior to taking up of any offer of or to continue 
in his or her employment’ (Refugee Regulations, 2010: art. 64). This can be interpreted 
to mean that refugees in Uganda should not have to apply for permission to work. As 
mentioned above, however, the situation in practice differs greatly from what the law 
states.  
Refugees in gazetted settlements also face many difficulties, despite being 
formally recognised. The encampment approach has drawn criticism for being 
‘expensive and inefficient, and restrict[ing] the ability of refugees to enjoy their rights 
while in exile’ (World Bank Group, 2016: 74). Consequently, the lack of access to 
rights seems to apply to all refugees in the country regardless of how and where they 
settle. 
While policies in Uganda have not become more restrictive in recent years, as 
is the case in Denmark, the difficulty in accessing basic socio-economic rights, among 
others, may nonetheless be a deterrent for asylum applicants and refugees already in 
the country. In order to mitigate the issues arising in Uganda due to structural 
challenges and the large number of refugees, the government has sought to implement 
a policy of self-reliance since the 1990s. It sets out to achieve self-reliance of refugees 
in the country in order to diminish dependency and facilitate local integration. 
4.2 Self-reliance 
Seemingly in contrast to measures of deterrence is the policy of self-reliance. The 
protracted nature of conflicts around the world has inevitably translated into refugee 
situations also becoming protracted, not least given the lack of options for resettlement, 
the impossibility of returning to the country of origin and the unwillingness of many 
host countries to enable long-term local integration. Refugee-hosting countries, 
especially those in the developing world, often rely almost entirely on external material 
assistance in managing the refugee situation. Aid from other countries or 
organisations, however, is generally short-lived and unsustainable for protracted 
refugeehood (Ayine, Tumwine & Kabumbuli, 2016: 78).  
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In order to break free from this dependency and overcome the challenges of 
systemic issues, Uganda has sought to implement a policy of self-reliance for its 
refugees. Self-reliance is not a new strategy unique to Uganda, but has been around in 
different forms since the League of Nations started assisting refugees in the 1920s and 
promoted increasingly by the UNHCR since the early 2000s (Skran & Easton-
Calabria, 2020: 6). Furthermore, enhancing refugee self-reliance forms part of the 
Refugee Compact’s core objectives (GCR, 2018: para 7). It refers to refugees 
becoming economically self-reliant through such methods as microfinance loans, 
agricultural settlement, vocational training and employment-matching schemes, in 
turn reducing the ‘burden’ on the host country and the international community at large 
(Skran & Easton-Calabria, 2020: 6). The aim is, therefore, to move from a care and 
maintenance approach to helping refugees build up their own livelihoods (Ayine, 
Tumwine & Kabumbuli, 2016: 78). In this context, refugees are no longer considered 
‘passive victims’, but recognised as responsive actors with the ability and wish to 
pursue their own livelihoods (Ayine, Tumwine & Kabumbuli, 2016: 78). The SRS is 
not only a way of providing refugees with the ability to build their self-esteem and be 
independent in their host country, but also to help gain knowledge and skills that will 
benefit them whether they integrate locally, repatriate or resettle (Ayine, Tumwine & 
Kabumbuli, 2016: 78).  
In the 1990s, the OPM of Uganda and the UNHCR defined the concept of self-
reliance ‘to find durable solutions to refugee problems by addressing refugee issues 
within the broad framework of government policy and to promote self-reliance and 
local integration of refugees through promoting social development initiatives in 
hosting areas’ (OPM & UNHCR, 2004: 2). Despite the shortcomings in Uganda’s 
refugee policy, the 2016 World Bank Report argues that Uganda offers refugees the 
best chance for self-reliance (World Bank Group, 2016: 2). However, while Uganda 
does observe a more liberal approach to refugee policy than many of its neighbouring 
countries, the country’s policy assumption that self-reliance can be achieved through 
subsistence agricultural production in gazetted settlements only is deeply flawed 
(Hunter, 2009: 13). 
While there are undoubtedly benefits to the current strategy, many issues 
preventing its success have not yet been tackled. The country’s settlement scheme is a 
major hindrance in achieving successful outcomes with the self-reliance policy. As 
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mentioned above, the SRS is only applied to refugees located in gazetted settlements. 
Yet, gazetted refugee settlements are often set up in areas with poor infrastructure, 
lower agricultural productivity and greater environmental degradation due to poor soil 
conditions and overuse (Hunter, 2009: 13). Given the conditions, self-reliance through 
crop cultivation and agricultural production is undeniably hard to achieve. In addition, 
not all refugees possess the knowledge and necessary tools to be successful in 
agricultural production. The policy says that refugees have to decide whether to 
continue receiving food rations or produce their own food, but there would be a 
significant food shortage if too little land were provided or available. In the Kyangwali 
settlement, for example, only 10.3% of refugees reported that the land allocated was 
able to meet their food needs (Ayine, Tumwine & Kabumbuli, 2016: 81). The study 
also showed that almost 80% of refugee households were unable to fulfil their maize 
consumption levels due to low production levels, meaning that they were in a better 
position when they were receiving food rations – a rather sad commentary on self-
reliance (Ayine, Tumwine & Kabumbuli, 2016: 78). Consequently, the model largely 
has not worked, with refugees unable to become more self-reliant over time (Crawford 
et al., 2019: 13). 
Other opportunities to achieve self-reliance are lacking in the Ugandan policy. 
The fact that SRS makes no more than a passing comment on the many self-settled 
refugees living in Uganda is problematic, not least as it fails to reflect the entire refugee 
population as well as missing the opportunity to learn from those who have self-settled 
and possibly achieved a greater level of self-reliance, independence and integration 
into the local community (Hovil, 2007: 601). 
Scholars such as Hovil and Kaiser14 have looked into how the self-reliance 
levels of self-settled refugees in Uganda compare to those in the gazetted settlements. 
A study by Hovil found that self-settled refugees living among the population of their 
host country rather than in secluded settlements dependent on aid also work, pay taxes 
and contribute to the economy of the communities they live in (Hovil, 2007: 618). 
However, while self-settled refugees in Uganda may be more likely to become truly 
self-reliant and locally integrated, they face many obstacles in achieving this goal. As 
 
14 Tania Kaiser, ‘Between a Camp and a Hard Place: Rights, Livelihood and Experiences of the Local 
Settlement System for Long-Term Refugees in Uganda’, The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 
44, No. 4 (December 2006), 597-621. 
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mentioned above, their greatest vulnerability lies in their uncertain legal status as this 
defines entitlement and access to rights. 
The question arises, therefore, whether the self-reliance strategy can truly 
contribute to achieving durable solutions to refugeehood in Uganda. And if not, 
whether there are other policies or measures being considered by the government to 
lighten the burden of the refugee presence. 
5.  A CHANCE FOR DURABLE SOLUTIONS? 
The above discussion has shown that the approaches to long-term refugee management 
in both Denmark and Uganda do not show much promise for achieving durable 
solutions to refugeehood. Denmark’s policies appear largely in line with those of the 
general ‘European approach’, aiming to keep refugee management outside the 
confines of its borders and make the country as unappealing as possible to asylum 
applicants. 
However, in the developing world in particular, many refugees find themselves 
in protracted refugeehood with little prospect of change in the near future, be it through 
repatriation, resettlement or local integration. Repatriation is an unlikely durable 
solution for those displaced in Uganda as Somalia and the DRC – two of the main 
refugee-producing countries – for example, continue to face serious instability (World 
Bank Group, 2016: 5). Hence, repatriating refugees to either one of these countries 
would constitute a direct violation of the principle of non-refoulement. Resettlement – 
the preferred option for many – is often not feasible given that it is an expensive 
solution offering only very limited spaces for resettlement and tied to specific 
requirements. 
Local integration is not considered part of Uganda’s government policy (World 
Bank Group, 2016: 5). This is largely based on the fact that the 1995 Ugandan 
Constitution as well as the Citizenship and Immigration Control Act (UCICA) of 1999 
both note that the children of refugees born on Ugandan soil are not entitled to be 
registered as citizens, even if one parent is a Ugandan national (Cole, 2014: 1). 
However, this provision is frequently wrongly interpreted to mean that refugees in 
Uganda do not have the right to naturalisation and obtain Ugandan citizenship at any 
point (Cole, 2014: 1). The issue of naturalisation is addressed in article 34 of the 1951 
Refugee Convention. It calls for contracting states to ‘as far as possible facilitate the 
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assimilation and naturalisation of refugees’ (UN, 1951: art. 34). While four African 
countries15 have elected to sign reservations to article 34, Uganda did not. The 
country’s domestic legislation makes provision for citizenship by naturalisation in 
article 16 of the UCICA based on fulfilment of a number of criteria, including 20 years 
residence, adequate knowledge of English or a vernacular language, and good 
character (Cole, 2014: 1). The applicability of this provision to refugees in Uganda 
was initially prevented by article 18 of the CARA, which stated that ‘no period spent 
in Uganda as a refugee shall be deemed to be residence in Uganda’ (Zakaryan, 2019: 
14). However, adoption of the 2006 Refugees Act removed the aforementioned 
provision, noting that naturalisation would simply be regulated by ‘the Constitution 
and any other law in force in Uganda’. Nevertheless, the question of obtaining 
citizenship for refugees in Uganda is a contentious one, often challenged by narrow 
interpretation of provisions in the UCICA. While the Ugandan Constitutional Court 
(UCC) ruled in 2015 that refugees were eligible for citizenship in Uganda through 
naturalisation, extending citizenship to the forcibly displaced remains a challenge with 
no successful cases to date (Zakaryan, 2019: 14). 
The acquisition of citizenship, however, is not the only indication of local 
integration. A broader conception of the term entails three dimensions (Fielden, 2008: 
1). Firstly, it is a legal process resulting in refugees attaining more rights in the host 
state. Secondly, it is an economic process enabling refugees to establish sustainable 
livelihoods and, in turn, an adequate standard of living. The third dimension refers to 
a social and cultural process of adaptation to and acceptance by the host society, with 
refugees being able to contribute to society without fear of discrimination (Fielden, 
2008: 1). 
The government of Uganda (GoU) has taken steps in collaboration with the 
UNHCR and other partners to emphasise and improve the self-reliance and resilience 
of refugees and their respective host communities and, in turn, achieve a durable 
solution. This has been done by way of the National Development Plan (NDP; 2020-
2030), among other policy developments, which includes a refugee-specific strategy 
known as the Settlement Transformative Agenda (STA; World Bank Group, 2016: 3). 
It aims to achieve ‘self-reliance and local settlement for refugees, and to promote social 
 
15 Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland 
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development in the refugee hosting areas as a durable solution to the refugees’ 
problems, while protecting national and local interests’ (World Bank Group,2016: 2). 
The NDP is closely linked to the CRRF, a framework introduced by the Refugee 
Compact. Uganda is one of seven countries in Africa and 15 in the world piloting the 
CRRF. It is considered a forerunner and a ‘proof of concept’ for the CRRF by many 
international actors, given its long-standing history of welcoming refugees and 
encouraging their integration (UNHCR, 2018: 4). 
Adoption of the CRRF has gained wide-ranging support to focus on more 
developmental approaches to refugee management and hosting in Uganda (Crawford 
et al., 2019: 8). Yet, despite a concerted effort of defining needs and drawing in a range 
of actors, it remains unclear whether it is sufficient to attract donors on the scale needed 
to transform the situation on the ground (Crawford et al., 2019: 8). The GoU has set 
out a roadmap for implementation of the framework with specific deliverables. 
Deliverables by 2020 include sharing of burden and responsibility for refugees hosted 
in Uganda, improved preparedness and data collection at the reception and admission 
stages, support for refugees and host communities by implementing the prioritised, 
comprehensive sector plans, and durable solutions for refugees formulated and 
reinforced both within Uganda and in third countries (Crawford et al., 2019: 8). In 
addition, various ministries have been involved in developing sector plans relating to 
such issues as education, health, jobs and livelihoods as well as water and the 
environment in what is referred to as a ‘whole of government’ approach (Crawford et 
al., 2019: 8). While it is too soon to measure the success of the NDP, its STA and the 
CRRF, their adoption gives hope for a future that includes a concerted effort to achieve 
durable solutions for Uganda’s refugees.  
6.  CONCLUSION  
To conclude, the two country case studies largely reflect the disparate approaches to 
refugee management taken in the two different regions. While both frequently result 
in deterrence and refoulement of some sort, the motivation or circumstance driving 
them appears to be different. 
As argued by Gammeltoft-Hansen (2017: 100), Denmark’s conduct with 
regard to refugee management seems to be in line with the emergence and expansion 
of policies of indirect deterrence. Despite being wedged in between two morally driven 
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countries – Germany and Sweden – that chose to open their borders to refugees in 
2015, Denmark made it very clear by introducing various restrictive policies that 
refugees are not welcome. 
This, however, is not a new development in Danish history. Resorting to 
methods of indirect deterrence may be considered a method of reclaiming sovereign 
decision-making in areas that are less heavily monitored and delineated by EU law and 
international law (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017: 107). Therefore, Denmark has opted out 
of several EU policies pertaining to areas of justice and home affairs. This has provided 
the country with more leeway and comparative advantages in adopting deterrence 
measures in its policies on asylum and family reunification in particular (Gammeltoft-
Hansen, 2017: 104). 
Nevertheless, the country is praised over and over again for its liberal and 
tolerant nature, polling as one of the best countries to live in, with low corruption and 
unemployment rates. This standard of living, however, appears to be reserved for 
Danish citizens and permanent residents only. American economist Milton Friedman 
stated that ‘free immigration’ and a welfare state are incompatible. The common 
sentiment among citizens appears to reflect the view that supporting non-citizens will 
eventually result in an inability to maintain the generous nature of the Danish welfare 
state. 
The Ugandan refugee policy appears quite impressive and progressive in 
contrast to the actions taken by other countries around the globe. Nevertheless, the 
refugee situation in the country is yet to improve (World Bank Group, 2016: 7). 
Decades of promoting self-reliance in the country do not appear to have been fruitful. 
The majority of the country’s refugees live in extreme poverty and face severe food 
insecurity, with around 80% living below the international poverty line (Crawford et 
al., 2019: 4). 
Given the limited successes of self-reliance in gazetted settlements, it is argued 
that self-settlement in Uganda is the better option for refugees, despite their not having 
access to humanitarian aid. Self-settled refugees interact more closely with the 
community, resulting in better integration into and acceptance by the local population. 
Hovil argues that it is the centrepiece of Uganda’s SRS – the system of gazetted 
settlements – that impedes effective local integration and suggests legalising the self-
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settlement of refugees in Uganda as an alternative refugee development policy that can 
benefit both the refugees and the host community (Hovil, 2007: 599 & 618). 
Furthermore, by piloting the CRRF and implementing the NDP, the GoU has 
indicated efforts towards improving its SRS. While the country as a whole, its refugees 
as well as the host communities remain challenged by wide-ranging structural issues, 
the NDP and CRRF provide a ray of hope that durable solutions can be achieved for 




Chapter 5: Conclusion and Recommendations 
This thesis has addressed the disparate approaches to refugee management in Europe 
and Africa as well as the ensuing prospects, or lack thereof, for durable solutions. By 
investigating the legal framework, both international and regional as applicable to the 
respective territories, the thesis delineates how the legislation and policies are applied 
in a domestic context. Chapter four discussed two case examples – Denmark and 
Uganda – taking their particular contexts into consideration when illustrating the 
‘European approach’ and the ‘African approach’ to refugee management. 
It is important to note that the issue at hand is not whether refugee management 
and, in turn, protection exists in the chosen territories, but rather what the legal 
framework is for the protection of refugees, how it is applied and what it means for 
long-term refugee management and achieving durable solutions. A common finding 
in both the ‘European approach’ and the ‘African approach’ is the prevalence of 
deterrence mechanisms as a means of refugee management. It appears, however, that 
while the EU and its member states are largely focussing on actively employing 
restrictive, and thereby deterrent policies, deterrence in Africa seems to result largely 
from an absence of policies or their effective implementation. Consequently, 
significant flaws in a dignified and rights-respecting approach to refugee management 
were identified in both territories. 
Gammeltoft-Hansen (2017: 106) points out that the broad range of new policies 
introduced across the EU appear to indicate that indirect deterrence has become a 
systematic response by European states. He notes that this development may also bring 
wide-ranging, fundamental changes to the dynamics of political cooperation with 
regard to asylum in the European Union. This observation is supported by the policy 
changes made in recent years. Nevertheless, research – and the case study of Uganda 
in particular – has shown that alternative methods of managing refugees that provide 
opportunities for self-reliance are being applied in Africa, with steps being taken to 
achieve sustainable solutions for the vast refugee population struggling with its 
protracted status. 
However, the durable solutions as proposed by the UNHCR – voluntary 
repatriation, resettlement and local integration – hardly seem feasible due to ongoing 
issues in the respective country of origin, lack of resettlement opportunities, or 
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unwillingness on the part of the host country to facilitate local integration. In the light 
of the shortcomings identified in effectively managing refugees, achieving durable 
solutions as well as respecting international refugee law, this thesis will conclude with 
the following recommendations: – 
1.  ENHANCING COOPERATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
As mentioned in chapter two, the Common European Asylum System, while implying 
a commonality in the system, does not actually represent a uniform system for all EU 
member states. Consequently, there are large discrepancies in the management and 
treatment of refugees across EU states. Due to the system allowing member states to 
opt out of regulations and directives, refugees may well have their claim rejected in 
one country without even having a chance to have their case heard in another where 
their odds might be better. 
This problem is amplified owing to the ‘first country of arrival’ rule set out in 
the Dublin Regulation. In order to avoid overwhelming the receiving countries on the 
EU’s external borders – often serving as said ‘first country of arrival’ – but also to give 
asylum applicants a chance of a procedure with favourable conditions, the EU is 
encouraged to abolish the aforementioned rule. 
Secondly, an important step to enhance cooperation among EU countries on 
the topic of asylum is mutual recognition of positive asylum decisions. Despite mutual 
recognition being a key principle of EU law, in the subfield of refugee law it has only 
been applied to negative asylum decisions so far (Guild et al., 2015: ii). Nevertheless, 
as stated in the EU Agenda on Migration, mutual recognition of positive decisions is 
arguably a requirement in fulfilling the obligation to ‘develop a common policy on 
international protection, comprising a uniform status valid throughout the Union’, as 
declared in article 78 of the TFEU (Guild et al., 2015: ii). It would also result in more 
effective operation of the CEAS, respecting key EU principles such as the free 
movement of individuals, their fundamental rights as well as fair sharing of 
responsibility for international protection (Guild et al., 2015: iii). 
Mutual recognition of national decisions is an important step towards 
achieving a functioning common asylum policy. Guild et al. have identified two 
possible options for implementation, both requiring legal reform but leading to 
smoother functioning of the CEAS overall. The first, more ambitious option would 
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require member states to recognise the grant of international protection by another 
member state, thereby making the status effectively EU-wide and arguably in line with 
the TFEU (Guild et al., 2015: iii). The second option, perhaps less ambitious but easier 
to implement, entails the right to move freely to other EU member states after two 
years of continuous legal residence in a member state (Guild et al., 2015: iii). These 
changes should be considered in order to enhance cooperation within the EU and, 
consequently, equitable sharing of the responsibility and burden of refugee presence. 
2.  ALTERNATIVE DURABLE SOLUTIONS  
As mentioned above, achievement of any of the durable solutions promoted by the 
UNHCR seems to have faced significant obstacles, leaving refugeehood to become 
increasingly protracted This thesis, therefore, suggests considering alternative 
solutions or a focus on ‘intermediate steps’ to improve the situation and increase the 
likelihood of eventually achieving one of the durable solutions and bringing 
refugeehood to an end. 
One solution to the ‘refugee problem,’ and consequently its management, that 
is named repeatedly is that of preventive protection or addressing the root cause. 
Addressing the underlying reasons that cause displacement would undoubtedly be the 
best approach, yet it is not an easy one, often not feasible at all and when it is, a time-
consuming endeavour. While it is an important area to focus on, shifting all gears 
towards this approach still will not attend to the question of managing and providing 
adequate protection for those already displaced. The world’s 26 million refugees as 
well as their host societies need an alternative approach to long-term management that 
will enhance the prospect of reaching durable solutions.  
There is undoubtedly a need for an all-encompassing approach in order to 
manage the ever-growing global refugee population and combat the protracted nature 
of refugee status today. Thus, a solution should be considered that focuses more 
intently on promoting equitable burden and responsibility sharing in line with the New 
York Declaration as well as the Refugee Compact. Burden and responsibility sharing 
are not a new phenomenon in refugee law; and the need for it has at least been alluded 
to – by emphasising the need for international cooperation and solidarity – if not 
explicitly mentioned across the international refugee law framework since the 1951 
Refugee Convention. While there seems to be a general consensus on the importance 
of burden and responsibility sharing on refugee matters, at least on paper, the absence 
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of a specific elaboration of countries’ contributions and no mention thereof in a legally 
binding document result in any activities in this regard being discretionary. 
3.  A NEED FOR ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS  
Following on from the recommendation that consideration be given to alternative 
durable solutions, the enforceability of all spheres of refugee law must also be 
considered. While the framework of refugee law is vast and widely agreed upon, it 
seems that merely encouraging the upholding of its provisions on humanitarian 
grounds is too idealistic. The only binding international refugee law documents are the 
1951 Refugee Convention and the 1969 OAU Convention. However, despite these 
conventions being legally binding, this thesis has shown that, in domestic and regional 
contexts, laws have been introduced over the years that appear to be in violation of the 
aforementioned, with little or no recourse when provisions are breached. 
It is a cause for concern, to say the least, that article 33 – the principle of non-
refoulement – which is considered an integral part of refugee law, seems to be violated 
by states in different ways and contexts daily. For instance, the restrictive laws 
introduced throughout Europe in recent years have been identified as violating article 
33. Furthermore, other rights of refugees and obligations of signatory states outlined 
in the 1951 Refugee Convention, and often reiterated in regional and domestic 
legislation, are violated time and time again. The lack of access to even basic human 
rights in order to lead a dignified and meaningful life is said to be a problem, 
particularly in the African context, for various reasons. 
Finally – and in the interests of pursuing durable solutions – it is important to 
address article 34 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, which relates to naturalisation. 
Only six of the 145 signatory states signed reservations to this article, implying their 
agreement and willingness to apply it together with the other 139. It can, therefore, be 
assumed that local integration, which is often described as having naturalisation as the 
final goal, is the preferred option. However, it has been established that this is not the 
case. Consequently, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to enhance compliance, 
thereby improving treatment of refugees as well as increasing the likelihood of 
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